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Introduction 
The intellectual property statutes provide for a range of remedies that are mainly intended to 
prevent infringements of intellectual property rights or to compensate the owner of those rights if 
they have been infringed. 
The nature of intellectual property rights are such though that this might not act as a sufficient 
deterrent to infringement and, for that reason, most of the statutes also provide courts with the 
power to award ‘additional damages – for the express purposes of punishing the infringer and acting 
as both a specific and general deterrent.     
Remedies for Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights 
The ‘normal’ remedies for infringement of intellectual property rights, under the intellectual 
property statutes, include injunctions (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit)1 and 
either damages or an account of profits.2 Of those remedies, injunctions and accounts of profits are 
discretionary remedies, while damages are available as of right with no room for the exercise of 
discretion.3  
Injunctions and the other two remedies are not mutually exclusive: see Coles v Dormer (2015) 117 
IPR 184; [2015] QSC 224 at [88], and importantly, as Henry J noted in that case (at [85]), ‘… if an 
injunction is granted it may, if promptly complied with, significantly reduce the proper quantum of 
any damages and additional damages orders.  
 
Of the two remedies that are available in the alternative4, damages or an account of profits, 
damages are intended to compensate ‘authors’ for any loss that they have suffered in consequence 
                                                             
1 The injunctions ordered may be mandatory and need not be in the form sought by the plaintiff. See, for 
example, Coles v Dormer (2015) 117 IPR 184; [2015] QSC 224 at [92] et seq, where Henry J discusses the 
considerations that are to be taken into account, citing Millett LJ in Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 288.  
2 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115(2); Designs Act 2003 (Cth) s 75(1); Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 122(1); Trade 
Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 126(1); Circuit Layouts Act 1989 (Cth) s 27(2); Plant Breeders Rights Act 1994 (Cth) ss 
56(3) and 56A(3). It  is clear from the sections that injunctions and the other two remedies are not mutually 
exclusive: see Coles v Dormer (2015) 117 IPR 184; [2015] QSC 224 at [88] 
3 LED Builders Pty Limited v Masterton Homes (NSW) Pty Limited (1994)54 FCR 196 at 197 and 198, Robert J 
Zupanovich Pty Ltd v B&N Beale Nominees Pty Ltd (1995) 59 FCR 49 at 64-65 and Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty 
Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569 at [17]-[18]. However, as the High Court noted in Warman International Ltd v Dwyer 
(1995) 182 CLR 544 at 559: ‘Although an account of profits, like other equitable remedies, is said to be 
discretionary, it is granted or withheld according to settled principles. It will be defeated by [inter alia] 
equitable defences such as estoppel, laches, acquiescence and delay’. The right to recover damages is limited, 
normally to 6 years from the time when the infringement took place (see, for example, Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) s 134) though that period is enlivened each time an individual infringement takes place (see LED Builders 
Pty Limited v Masterton Homes (NSW) Pty Limited (1994)54 FCR 196 at 198 
4 Damages and an account of profits are inconsistent remedies and plaintiffs must seek either one or the 
other; they cannot seek both: Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Bata Shoe Company of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 
FCR 230 at 232 citing Neilson v Betts (1871) LR 5 HL 1; De Vitre v Betts (1873) LR 6 HL 319 at 321; United 
of the infringement; an account is intended to deprive the infringer of his or her ‘ill-gotten gains’5.  
The section does not specifically state who must make the election but the cases make it clear that 
the choice belongs to the plaintiff.6 Importantly, that choice need not normally be made before trial 
and may be delayed until all of the evidence has been heard, at least in a trial where liability and 
quantum are not split7 (though - as Carr J noted in Robert J Zupanovich Pty Ltd v B&N Beale 
Nominees Pty Ltd (1995) 59 FCR 49, there could be situations where the interests of justice could 
require a plaintiff to elect between the two alternatives before trial8, but that will not necessarily be 
the case, and whether it is will depend on the circumstances of the case9).    
If a plaintiff elects to seek compensatory damages he or she cannot then also claim the profits made 
by the defendant as ‘additional damages’ on the basis that they were a ‘benefit’ obtained by reason 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1; Thornton Hall Manufacturing Ltd v Shanton Apparel Ltd [1989] 3 
NZLR 304; Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25 at 32; Island Records Ltd v Tring 
International Plc [1996] 1 WLR 1256 at 1258; [1995] 3 All ER 444 at 446-447 and Tang Man Sit (Personal 
Representatives of) v Capacious Investments Ltd [1996] 1 AC 514. See also Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd 
(2012) 199 FCR 569 at [16]. 
5 See Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25 at 32. See also International Writing 
Institute Inc v Rimila Pty Limited (1995) 57 FCR 135 at 136 (per Burchett, Whitlam and Kiefel JJ): ‘The two 
remedies are of course quite different, damages being a compensation for loss suffered by the owner of the 
copyright whereas an account of profits requires the wrong-doer to give up any profits made. In that sense a 
claim for an account has been taken to condone the infringement: see eg per Lord Porter in Caxton Publishing 
Co Ltd v Sutherland Publishing Co [1939] AC 178 at 198’. One consequence of this is that, as Lander and 
Gordon JJ noted in Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569 at [18]: ‘There is no element of 
punishment in an account of profits. The purpose is to prevent the infringer becoming unjustly enriched: Dart 
Industries Inc v Décor Corporation Pty Ltd (1993) 179 CLR 101 at 114-115 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and 
Toohey JJ’. 
6 Peter Pan Manufacturing Corporation v Corsets Silhouette Limited, [1964] 1 WLR 96 at 106 though in 
Concrete Systems v Devon Symonds (1978) 20 SASR 79 at 84 Legoe J says at 84 that ‘In my opinion, the statute 
now removes that option from the plaintiff and places a discretion upon the court to grant which of the 
alternative relief under sub-so (2) may appear appropriate to the court at the trial of the action’ (emphasis 
added). This runs counter to Gentry Homes Pty Ltd v Diamond Homes Pty Ltd [1993] AIPC 39,371 where 
Beazley J rejected the suggestion that an election is not required and that the Court is required to exercise a 
discretion as to which remedy to award. Beazley’s view was subsequently cited with approval by Lindgren J in 
Led Builders Pty Ltd v Eagle Homes Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 436 at 450. Given the thrust of subsequent decisions, 
Legoe J’s view is unlikely to be a correct interpretation of the section. See, for example, Coles v Dormer (2015) 
117 IPR 184; [2015] QSC 224 at [85] per Henry J. 
7 Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Bata Shoe Company of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 230 at 237: ‘In my view, 
an applicant cannot be compelled to insist upon an election being made before the commencement of trial 
and, consistently with the cases to which I have referred, in my opinion the applicant is entitled to delay 
making an election at least until all the evidence is in.’ This is to ensure that the plaintiff ‘is able to make an 
informed choice’: see Island Records Ltd v Tring International Plc [1996] 1 WLR 1256 at 1258; [1995] 3 All ER 
444 at 447’. See also Coles v Dormer (2015) 117 IPR 184; [2015] QSC 224 at [85] where Henry J noted that, ‘… 
as is their right the plaintiffs have delayed their election as to damages or an account of profits … pending my 
decision as to whether an injunction will be granted’. On the issue of when the election must be made see Tivo 
inc v Vivo International Corp Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 797 from [39] 
8 As could be the case where any unreasonable delay could prejudice the defendant: see Island Records Ltd v 
Tring International Plc [1996] 1 WLR 1256 at 1258; [1995] 3 All ER 444 at 447. 
9 Robert J Zupanovich Pty Ltd v B&N Beale Nominees Pty Ltd (1995) 59 FCR 49 at 64-65 per Carr J. Those 
circumstances could include whether damages were, in fact, available, as might not be the case if the 
defendant was not aware that he or she had committed an infringement; see Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 
115(3), Designs Act 2003 (Cth) s 75(2); Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 123(1); Circuit Layouts Act 1989 (Cth) s 27(3); 
Plant Breeders Rights Act 1994 (Cth) s 57 There is no equivalent provision in the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). In 
LED Builders Pty Limited v Masterton Homes (NSW) Pty Limited (1994)54 FCR 196 the parties agreed that the 
question of damages or account of profits was ‘one which should be left until after the Court’s decision on the 
question of liability was known.  
of the infringement. As Lander and Gordon JJ noted in Facton Ltd v Rifai fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 
FCR 569 at [37]: ‘ Section 115(4)(b)(iii) does not allow an owner who has elected to be compensated 
in damages to seek an account of profits in addition to the award of damages. Section  115(4) only 
comes to be considered after the owner has elected for damages and has no part to play if the 
owner has elected for an account of profits …’10  
 
Where an account is sought it has been held that the profits to which the plaintiff will be entitled 
‘will be limited to the profits made by [the defendant] during the period when it knew of the 
applicant’s rights’,11 thereby, to a large extent, complementing the provision in s 115(3) that 
damages are not to be awarded if the defendant was not aware and had no reasonable grounds for 
suspecting, that the Act constituting the infringement was an infringement – though that provision 
does go on to say that the plaintiff is ‘entitled to an account of profits in respect of the infringement 
…’. 
 
In the case of copyright infringements, damages might also be awarded for conversion12 or 
detention,13 and plaintiffs can also recover any infringing copies (or the device for making them).14 
That remedy is available in addition to any order under s 11515 – though it is not to be granted if 
                                                             
10 See also per Gilmour J at [106]. 
11 LED Builders Pty Limited v Masterton Homes (NSW) Pty Limited (1994)54 FCR 196 at 198 citing Colbeam 
Palmer Ltd v Stock affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 112 24 at 34, a case involving a trade mark infringement, in which 
Windeyer J had traced the origins of the statutory injunction and account remedies to their equitable 
antecedents (under which they were discretionary) and held that they were governed by the same principles 
and (at 198) that they ‘were intended to be applied in cases of infringement of copyright in the way that they 
have been applied over the years …’. Sheppard J used the same approach to the question of damages saying 
(at 198) ‘My reason for thinking that there is no discretion in relation to damages is that I fail to see why they 
are not to be regarded as a common law remedy’. 
12 See International Writing Institute Inc v Rimila Pty Limited (1995) 57 FCR 135 at 139: ‘Conversion occurs 
when goods are dealt with in a manner inconsistent with the rights of the owner, but this must be clear: 
Caxton Publishing at 189. Whilst it is possible that conversion occurs at some different point (as was found on 
the facts in Caxton Publishing) the sale of the goods will, generally speaking, provide the necessary certainty. 
This appears to be the view expressed by Walton J in Lewis Trusts v Bamber Stores Ltd [1982] FSR 281 at 298’. 
The other IP statutes do not contain an equivalent provision. 
13 See Gordon J in Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 633 at [42] et seq for a 
discussion of damages under s 116. 
14 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116(1). In Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Tri-Star Pictures Inc v Luckins 
(1996) 34 IPR 504; [1996] FCA 1606 at [37] Tamberlin J described the difference between conversion damages 
and damages for infringement of copyright as follows: ‘The principle which underlies conversion damages is 
that the copyright holder is entitled to treat an infringing copy as its property (emphasis added) so that any 
dealing with it inconsistent with that proprietary right amounts to conversion of that article. See Sutherland 
Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd [1936} 1 Ch where Lord Wright MR at 338, made it clear that the 
remedy in conversion is a different legal method of compensation devised to prevent a stranger from 
acquiring, taking or selling infringing copies which in itself amounts to a wrong additional to infringement of 
the copyright. The legal principle is that compensation for infringement is in respect of a wrong done to an 
incorporeal right, namely copyright, whereas conversion is for conversion of the particular chattels which 
comprise the infringing chattels’. Consequently, if the converted articles are returned that should affect the 
applicable conversion. So, for example, in Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 274; 130 ALR 
659 at 690 von Doussa J, having ordered that all unsold carpets be delivered up, noted: ‘If those carpets are 
returned I do not consider it appropriate to award damages in addition for the conversion of them which 
occurred at the time of their entry into Australia … the delivery up of those carpets will make good the damage 
flowing from the conversion’. 
15 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116(1B). See also Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Tri-Star Pictures Inc v 
Luckins (1996) 34 IPR 504; [1996] FCA 1606 at [36] per Tamberlin J: ‘Although it is well settled that conversion 
damages are cumulative with and can be granted in addition to infringement damages…’ 
relief under s 115 would be a sufficient remedy.16 It will also not be available if the infringement was 
innocent.17 If damages are sought in conversion ‘the relevant measure of damages for copyright 
conversion is the same as for conversion at common law, that is, “by reference to the value of the 
goods converted”: Infabrics Ltd v Jaytex Ltd [1982] AC 1 at 26 and W H Brine Co v Whitton (1981) 55 
FLR 440 at 448-450 and … the value of the goods converted is the figure that someone is prepared to 
pay for them: Caxton Publishing Co at 203-204. That market value is the normal measure is well 
established: see Caxton Publishing at 190’18.  
 
If those statutory remedies are not available (usually because the intellectual property was not 
registered under the relevant statute) or, for other reasons, they are not adequate or appropriate, 
other remedies may be available under the tort of passing off, under the misleading or deceptive 
conduct provisions in s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law or, possibly, in an action for breach of 
confidence.19 In appropriate cases (though only for breaches of copyright), an action might also lie in 
conversion or detention because of an unauthorized use of physical materials.20  
If damages are awarded under the ‘general remedies’ provisions in the intellectual property statutes 
(ie through other than the ‘additional damages’ provisions), they are compensatory in nature.21 They 
                                                             
16 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116(1C). Even before the inclusion of s 116(1C), while damages could be awarded 
under both s 115(20 and s 116, the Courts were careful to avoid any overlap. See Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty 
Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 275; 130 ALR 659 at 691. See also Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Tri-Star 
Pictures Inc v Luckins (1996) 34 IPR 504; [1996] FCA 1606 at [36] per Tamberlin J: ‘…  I do not think that 
conversion damages are appropriate in this case. The infringement damages which I have estimated overlap 
and take into account the damage which might otherwise be granted by way of conversion damages and the 
authorities indicate that in such circumstances the Court should take care not to over compensate’.  See also 
Polygram Editions v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 573 where Lockhart J commented: ‘Although 
the applicants elected to pursue damages under s 115(2), at one stage of the case the applicants did not press 
this claim. Doubtless this course was taken because conversion damages, which were also sought, are usually 
higher than compensatory damages under s 115(2), and applicants naturally prefer to obtain the higher award. 
It is unlikely that the applicants would have successfully claimed full damages under both ss 115(2) and 116 
since the damages would overlap significantly and would be reduced by the extent of the overlap. … In any 
event, towards the end of the case the applicants revived their claim and sought nominal damages under s 
115(2) in addition to conversion damages. The applicants’ reasons for persisting with this claim will become 
apparent when I deal with the additional damages issue’. See also Coles v Dormer (2015) 117 IPR 184; [2015] 
QSC 224 at [83] where Henry J, while finding that there had been a conversion of the plaintiff’s house plans, 
refused to award damages under s 116 ‘because the relief allowed for by s 115 for infringement of copyright 
will provide sufficient remedy in this case’. 
17 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116(2) 
18 International Writing Institute Inc v Rimila Pty Limited (1995) 57 FCR 135 at 138 per Burchett, Whitlam and 
Kiefel JJ 
19 Though, as Bowen CJ in Equity observed in Interfirm Comparison (Aust) Pty Ltd v Law Society of New South 
Wales (1975) 6 ALR 445, damages for breaches of copyright and for breaches of confidence are not 
cumulative.  
20 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116. There are no equivalent provisions in the other intellectual property 
statutes. See Autodesk Inc v Yee (1996) (1996) 68 FCR 391 and Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing 
Ltd [1936] 1 Ch 323 (considering the then UK equivalent - s 7 of the the Copyright Act 1911 (UK)) and Columbia 
Pictures Industries Inc and Tri-Star Pictures Inc v Luckins (1996) 34 IPR 504; [1996] FCA 1606  at [35]-[38]. In the 
UK, the Report of the Whitford Committee, 1977, and the White Paper on Intellectual Property and Innovation, 
1986 recommended that damages for conversion be abolished (on the grounds that such damages could be, as 
the Whitford Committee report put it (at para 702),  ‘out of all proportion to the injury suffered’). The 
Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK) repealed the provision. 
21 See, for example, Henry J in Coles v Dormer (No 2) (2016 330 ALR 151; 117 IPR 204; [2016] QSC 28 at [6]: 
“given the availability of damages in s 115(2) as an alternative to an account of profits and given the 
availability of additional damages through s 115(4), it is apparent the reference to damages in s 115(2) is to 
compensatory damages’. 
are intended to compensate the owner of rights for the losses he or she actually suffers as a result of 
the infringement22 and they are assessed on principles that are similar to an award of damages in 
tort.23  
 
That is, as Lord Wilberforce noted in General Tire and Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co Ltd 
[1975] 2 All ER 173 at 177, after finding that infringement of a patent was a tort,24 that:  
‘As in the case of any other tort (leaving aside cases where exemplary damages can be given) 
the object of damages is to compensate for loss or injury. The general rule at any rate in 
relation to ‘economic’ torts is that the measure of damages is to be, so far as possible, that 
sum of money which will put the injured party in the same position as he would have been in 
if he had not sustained the wrong’.25   
 
Therefore, for example, matters that are not relevant to a plaintiff’s loss are not to be taken into 
consideration. Consequently, in Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd [1977] VR 65 (at 70); (1975) 29 FLR 
59 (at 65); (1975) 12 ALR 59 (at 70), when Gowans J was considering the appropriate measure of 
compensatory damages, and the possible relevance to that calculation of the benefit that the 
defendant may have derived from the infringement, held that it was not relevant, saying: ‘It is … the 
damage to the copyright in the hands of the plaintiff and not the benefit to the defendant that is the 
critical test’.26 
 
Because damages are compensatory, there also cannot be any overlap between damages for 
infringement of the IP statutes and damages for conversion, breach of s 18 (or the other misleading 
or deceptive conduct provisions) of the Australian Consumer Law, breach of confidence, passing off 
or any other possible head of claim founded on the same facts.  
 
A claim for damages for infringement of intellectual property rights is ‘a claim for a wrong done to 
an incorporeal right’27 and the ‘measure of damages’ to be awarded in such cases was described by 
Lord Wright MR as ‘the depreciation caused by the infringement to the value of the copyright28 as a 
chose in action’.29  
                                                             
22 Leica Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 at [89] per Collier J, citing A V Jennings Ltd v 
Bogdan [2009] FCA 307 at [90]; Interfirm Comparison (Aust) Pty Limited v Law Society of New South Wales 
(1975) 6 ALR 445 at 446; Bailey v Namol Pty Limited (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 111; Aristocrat Technologies 
Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 157 FCR 564; (2007) 239 ALR 702 at [25] per 
Black CJ and Jacobsen J. See also Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [17] 
23 Bailey v Namol Pty Limited (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 110 and Facton Ltd v Rifai fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 
569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [17]. 
24 Infringements of intellectual property statutes are considered to be tortious, so the common law principles 
as to liability of tortfeasors applies to such infringements: see, in the context of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), 
WEA International Inc v Hanimex Corporation Ltd (1987) 17 FCR 274 at 283 and Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd 
(1994) 54 FCR 240 at 264; 130 ALR 659 at 680. 
25 Citing Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39.  
26 That benefit can, however, be taken into account when the court is considering whether ‘it is proper’ to 
award additional damages. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 115(4)(b)(iii); Designs Act 2003 (Cth) s 75(3); Patents 
Act 1990 (Cth) s 122(1A)(d); Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 126(20(d); Circuit Layouts Act 1989 (Cth) s 
27(4)(b)(ii). 
27 Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Tri-Star Pictures Inc v Luckins (1996) 34 IPR 504; [1996] FCA 1606 at [16] 
per Tamberlin J.  
28 In Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd [1977] VR 65 at 70; (1975) 29 FLR 59 at 65; (1975) 12 ALR 59 at 70, 
Gowans J said that that formulation ‘refers to loss of sales and injury to reputation and the like’. 
29 Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Ltd [1936] 1 Ch 323 at 336. His Lordship’s comment was 
made in the context of a dispute regarding the inter-relationship between ss 6 and 7 of the Copyright Act 1911 
(UK). The former provided for damages for breach of copyright, the latter dealt with damages for conversion 
The difficulty with that formulation is that it is not always easy ‘to establish that the infringing 
[conduct] has caused a quantifiable diminution in the value of the rights comprised in the 
copyright’.30 As a result it has been subject to a great deal of judicial comment and it is now accepted 
that it is ‘no more than a convenient label for the various ways of assessing damages which are 
available in any particular case’,31 that damages are available for any loss that an owner has suffered 
as a result of an infringement of his or her intellectual property rights,32 that the appropriate 
quantum of damages is, as Lord Wilberforce had put it in General Tire and Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre 
and Rubber Co Ltd [1975] 2 All ER 173 at 177: ‘the sum of money which will put the injured party in 
the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong’, 33 that, accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
for the same infringement and the question was whether the remedies were in the alternative or whether 
they could apply, cumulatively, to the same infringement.. 
30 Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Tri-Star Pictures Inc v Luckins (1996) 34 IPR 504; [1996] FCA 1606 at [19] 
per Tamberlin J. See also, Leica Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 where Collier J 
awarded only nominal damages for the defendant’s infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright, noting (at [91]), 
‘There is no evidence before me that the value of the applicant’s source code or associated materials has 
diminished by the conduct of Mr Koudstaal. There is, for example, no evidence that the applicants cannot 
continue to use the Taken Materials in the manner in which they were using them prior to the events 
discussed in this judgment (cf discussion of Blackburn CJ in Australasian Performing Rights Association v Grebo 
Trading Co Pty Ltd (1978) 23 ACTR 30 at 31) ’.  
31 Australasian Performing Rights Association v Grebo Trading Co Pty Ltd (1978) 23 ACTR 30 at 31 where 
Blackburn CJ went on to note: ‘In the case before me, the phrase means that the copyright has been less 
valuable to its owner than it was before the infringement, because it then had the potentiality of generating 
the income which would have been derived from the lawful performance of these musical works, and it has 
not in fact generated that income.. The difference is the income which should have been generated; that is to 
say the fess that the infringers would have paid in order to perform the works lawfully. That amount, for the 
purposes of this case, is the ‘depreciation in the value of the copyright’. 
32 So, for example, in Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 277; 130 ALR 659 at 692 von Doussa J 
held that ‘the assessment of damages under s 115(2) may include damages for personal suffering, for example 
for insulting behavior … and for humiliation … In the present case the infringements have caused personal 
distress and, potentially at least, have exposed the artists to embarrassment and contempt within their 
communities, if not to the risk of diminished earning potential and physical harm. … Losses resulting from 
tortious wrongdoing experienced by Aboriginals in their particular environments are properly to be brought to 
account’. 
33 See Interfirm Comparison (Australia) Pty Ltd v Law Society of New South Wales (1975) 6 ALR 445 where 
Bowen CJ in Equity noted (at 446): ‘it would, in my opinion, be wrong to treat the measure of damages for 
breach of copyright stated by Lord Wright MR in Sutherland Publishing Co Ltd v Caxton Publishing Co Ltd … as 
having the force and rigidity of statutory provision. The purpose of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for 
the loss which he has suffered as a result of the defendant’s breach’. See, also, Concrete Systems v Devon 
Symonds (1978) 20 SASR 79 at 84; Bailey v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 110-11; Statuscard Australia Pty 
Ltd v Rotondo [2009] 1 Qd R 559; (2008) 219 FLR 206 at [117]; Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty 
Ltd [2009] FCA 633 at [6]; Seafolly Pty Ltd v Fewstone Pty Ltd (2014) 313 ALR 41 at [510] and Leica Geosystems 
Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 at [89]. See also Pacific Enterprises (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bernen Pty Ltd 
(2014) 321 ALR 715 where Pagone J said at [5]: ‘The award of damages should, as far as possible, restore 
Pacific to the position it would have been in had the infringements not occurred: see Pearce v Paul Kingston 
Pty Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 591 at 592 ; General Tire & Rubber Co v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 819 
at 824 ; (1975) 1B IPR 713 at 726 ; [1975] 2 All ER 173 at 177 ; [1976] RPC 197 at 212 . That would generally 
require the assessment of damages by reference to a common sense causal link between the infringing 
conduct and the loss suffered: see Bitech Engineering v Garth Living Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 822 at [75] ; Catnic 
Components Ltd v Hill & Smith Ltd [1983] FSR 512 at 521; Gerber Garment Technology Inc v Lectra Systems Ltd 
[1997] RPC 443 (Gerber); Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Eurocell Building Plastics Ltd [2006] EWHC 1344 (Pat), at [47]. 
In TS & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 3Fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 158 FCR 444; 239 ALR 117 at [207] 
Finkelstein J noted that ‘lost profit is usually the best measure of damage’ at least when the parties are in 
actual or potential competition and in Norm Engineering Pty Ltd v Digga Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 162 FCR 1 
Greenwood J adopted a five step approach to the calculation of lost profits, an approach subsequently 
summarised by Gordon J in Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd (20008 172 FCR 580 at [13] as 
the appropriate measure of damages will depend on the particular circumstance of each case,34 that 
they may include damages for indirect losses (such as damage to goodwill) as long as the cause is the 
infringement, the loss is foreseeable and is not unduly speculative’35 and that  damages can be ‘at 
large’, allowing the court to award ‘what amount I think right as if I were a jury’36 (though within the 
constraint that they are not intended to punish the infringer37).  
At common law compensatory damages can be awarded for damage to reputation38 and it too may 
therefore also be compensated by damages under the ‘general remedies’ provisions in the 
intellectual property statutes.39 The common law also permits the award of aggravated40 and/or 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
‘(1) examine the number of sales made by the Respondent; (2) assume that the Respondent was trying to 
capture sales from the Applicant, the market leader; (3) assume that the number of sales made by the 
Respondent is equal to the number of sales lost by the Applicant; (4) discount the number in (3) to reflect the 
fact that not all sales made by the Respondent can be considered sales lost by the Applicant; and (5) apply any 
further discount necessary in the circumstances of the case…’. See, generally, on the method of calculating 
damages Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Malec v JC Hutton Pty Ltd (1990) 169 CLR 638 at 643 (explained by 
Finkelstein J in Axe Australasia Pty Ltd v Australume Pty Ltd (2006) 69 IPR 45; [2006] FCA 668 at [34]). 
34 Bailey v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 111. See also Statuscard Australia Pty Ltd v Rotondo [2009] 1 Qd 
R 559; (2008) 219 FLR 206 at [117] where the appropriate measure of damages was held to be ‘the loss of sales 
suffered by the plaintiff’ and Coles v Dormer (No 2) (2016) 330 ALR 151; 117 IPR 204; [2016] QSC 28 where, 
although there was no pecuniary loss, damages of $10,000 were awarded under s 115(2) as compensation for 
the plaintiff’s ‘temporary past loss of enjoyment of his locally unique residence’: see at [15]. 
35 TS & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 3Fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 158 FCR 444; 239 ALR 117 at [207] per 
Finkelstein J. See also Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd (2008) 172 FCR 580 at [11] per 
Gordon J and  Seafolly Pty Ltd v Fewstone Pty Ltd (2014) 313 ALR 41 at [614] per Dodds-Stretton J..  
36 Fenning Film Services Ltd v Wolverhampton Walsall & District Cinemas Ltd [1914] 3 KB 1171 at 1174 per 
Horridge J. See also Spotless Group Limited v Blanco Catering Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 979 where Mansfield J noted 
at [133]: ‘… in certain circumstances, the assessment of damages for copyright may simply be ‘at large’. That 
will be the case where, for example, the applicant has no previous practice of licensing the copyright material 
and is unable to prove any specific loss of commercial opportunity as a result of the respondent’s infringement 
of that copyright. In such cases the Court will seek to give ‘what amount I think right as if I were a jury …’.  See 
also Nominet UK v Diverse Internet Pty Ltd (No 2) (2005) 68 IPR 131 at [49],  TS & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 
3Fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 158 FCR 444; 239 ALR 117 at [205] (‘When damages are described as 
being “at large” judges sometimes mean that the plaintiff need not prove specific or special damage, but that 
seems to be confined to actions where damage is the gist of the claim. In other cases the reference is to the 
ability to recover damages not confined to pecuniary loss, for example loss of reputation can be taken into 
account’) and Leica Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 at [89]. See also Australian 
Performing Right Association Limited v Riceboy Pty Limited [2011] FMCA 942 at [22]: ‘Copyright damages are 
said to be “at large”, or “a jury question”.  By this is meant that they are not to be the subject of exhaustive 
analysis, but that the judge must do his or her best to settle upon an appropriate figure in light of all of the 
available evidence’. 
37 Bailey v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 110-11; Norm Engineering Pty Ltd v Digga Australia Pty Ltd 
(2007) 162 FCR 1 at [264]; Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 633 at [5] and Leica 
Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 at [89]. The non-punitive nature of damages under, in 
that case, s 115(2) was also emphasized in Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] 
FCAFC 9 at [19].  
38 See, for example, Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd [1977] VR 65 at 70; (1975) 29 FLR 59 at 65; (1975) 12 ALR 
59 at 70 and TS & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 3Fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 158 FCR 444; 239 ALR 117 at 
[205] 
39 See, for example, Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9: at [25]: ‘An 
owner’s loss of reputation sounds in compensatory damages and may be awarded under s 115(2) of the 
Copyright Act if the evidence justifies such an award. See also Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton on Clothing Pty 
Ltd (2009) 81 IPR 378; [2009] FCA 633 and Review Australia Pty Ltd v Innovative Lifestyle Investments Pty Ltd 
and Anor (2008) 166 FCR 358; [2008] FCA 74 and GM Holden Ltd v Paine (2011) 281 ALR 406 at [90] (in relation 
to the  Designs Act). 
exemplary41 damages as part of ‘compensation, so it appears that they could also be considerations 
that a court could take into account in determining the quantum of compensation under the Acts’ 
‘general damages’ provisions. 
Damages in all such cases may have to be estimated if they cannot be precisely calculated.42 Some 
loss must, however, be shown before any compensatory damages can be awarded, the plaintiff 
bears that onus43 and it is not enough to show, simply, that the defendant was guilty of wrongful 
conduct.44 If, however, loss can be shown, the courts must then do their best to quantify the loss, 
even if some degree of speculation and guess work is involved.45   
If loss arising from the infringement cannot be shown, nominal damages may still be awarded under 
this head to vindicate the invasion of [the plaintiff’s] proprietary rights’.46 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
40 As Windeyer J noted in Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Limited (1966) 117 CLR 118 at 149: ‘… aggravated 
damages are given to compensate the plaintiff when the harm done to him by a wrongful act was aggravated 
by the manner in which the act was done.‘ 
41 See also Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Limited (1966) 117 CLR 118 at 149 per Windeyer J: ‘…exemplary 
damages … are intended to punish the defendant, and presumably to serve one or more of the objects of 
punishment – moral retribution or deterrence. ‘ 
42 See, for example, Hugo Boss Trade Mark Management GmbH & Co Kg v Sasalili Oxford Fia [2014] FCA 1328 
at [27]: ‘In my view an award of damages of $20,000 would compensate the applicant for the damage caused 
by the Respondent’s conduct even if some degree of speculation and guesswork is involved: see, eg, Adidas-
Salomon AG v Turner (2003) 58 IPR 66 at [5]’ and (at[28] ‘While the applicant has limited evidence available [of 
its loss] … that does not preclude the Court finding that compensatory damages can be awarded. …  the Court 
must do its best to quantify the loss suffered by the applicant by reason of the Respondents’ infringement of 
the Applicant’s Hugo Boss Trade Marks’. 
43 Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 633 at [6] 
44 Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 157 FCR 564; (2007) 
239 ALR 702 at [35].  See also Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 83 per Mason CJ 
and Dawson J and Leica Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 at [89].  
45 See n 35 above and Spotless Group Limited v Blanco Catering Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 979 where Mansfield J 
noted at [133]: ‘…the fact that damages cannot be calculated precisely should not prevent the Court from 
making an award of damages, even if some element of speculation and guesswork is involved: see generally 
Fenning Film Service Ltd v Wolverhampton, Walsall and District Cinemas, Limited [1914] 3 KB 1171 at 1174; 
Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 at 477 per Wilcox J; Columbia Pictures Inc v Luckins 
(1996) 34 IPR 504 at 510 per Tamberlin J; Enzed Holdings Ltd v Wynthea Pty Ltd (1984) 3 IPR 504 619 at 637 
per Sheppard, Morling and Wilcox JJ; Foxtel Management Pty Ltd v Mod Shop Pty Ltd (2007) 165 FCR 149 at 
[315]-[336] per Siopsis J.’  For a statement of general principle concerning the Courts duty to quantify loss as 
best it can, see Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd (2003) 196 ALR 257 at 266 (and the 
authorities cited there) per Hayne J. See also Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 at 83 
per Mason CJ and Dawson J and Leica Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 at [89] and [91]. 
See also Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd  (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [28] per Lander and Gordon 
JJ re loss of reputation – where evidence of the value of the loss of reputation is not available, the Court is 
obliged to consider the value as best it can citing Commonwealth v Amann Aviation Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 64 
at 83 per Mason CJ and Dawson J: ‘The settled rule, both here and in England, is that mere difficulty in 
estimating damages does not relieve a court from the responsibility of estimating them as best it can’. 
46 MJA Scientifics International Pty Ltd v SC Johnson & Sons Pty Ltd (1999) 43 IPR 275 at 281 per Sundberg J 
(citing Hanfstaengl v WH Smith [1905] 1 Ch 519), cited with approval in Spotless Group Limited v Blanco 
Catering Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 979 at [134] and in Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 2) 
[2008] FCA 746; (2008) 76 IPR 763 at [16]. See also Leica Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 
1129 at [89] and the authorities cited there and Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for 
Educational Research Ltd (2012) 211 FCR 563; [2012] FCA 779 at [118] (not subject to adverse comment on 
appeal: Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd [2013] FCAFC 62), 
Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 157 FCR 564; (2007) 
239 ALR 702 at [2] and [38]-[39] and Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 633 at 
Additional Damages 
In addition to the ‘normal remedies’ the intellectual property statutes all now provide for what they 
call ‘additional damages’.  
 
Additional damages are to be distinguished from compensatory damages. They are, as the name 
implies ‘additional’ to compensatory damages and their purpose is not to compensate plaintiffs for 
any loss they might have suffered47 but to punish and deter defendants from further infringing 
conduct.48 They are an independent head of relief,49 they exist to allow courts to grant ‘something 
equivalent to exemplary damages’ where awards of general damages might be thought to be 
inadequate,50 - though they are ‘not limited to cases in which the conventional remedies, including 
compensatory damages, are insufficient to redress the wrong suffered by the copyright holder’,51 
they are awarded on bases similar to those on which aggravated or exemplary damages are 
awarded52 - though they have an existence of their own,53 they are discretionary54 (in relation to, 
both, whether it is ‘proper’ to make an award and, if so, in what amount55) and that discretion is 
‘unfettered’,56 they may be arbitrary,57 they need bear no relationship to any  compensatory 
damages awarded58 and they are awarded on of their own principles. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
[6]. For an equivalent statement in relation to s 126(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) see Halal 
Certification Authority Pty Limited v Scadilone Pty Limited [2014] FCA 614 at [89]. 
47 Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88(1997) 145 ALR 1 at 6. See also Zero 
Tolerance Entertainment Inc v Venue Adult Shops Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 155 at [163]. 
48 Halal Certification Authority Pty Limited v Scadilone Pty Limited [2014] FCA 614 at [96]-[98] 
49 Autodesk Inc v Yee (1996) 139 ALR 735 at 738–9; Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 
FCR 88; (1997) 145 ALR 1 at 6; Zero Entertainment v Venus at [163]. The equivalent UK and NZ provisions have 
been interpreted as applying in exactly the same way: see, for example, Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Alfred 
McAlpine Homes East Ltd (No 2) [1996] FSR 36 at 43,where Laddie J referred to additional damages as being ‘a 
head of relief independent of and not dependent upon whatever form of financial relief the plaintiffs seek’ and 
International Credit Control Ltd v Axelsen [1974] 1 NZLR 695 at 703 (though noting, as Lockhart J did in 
Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 576: ‘Although assistance may be gleaned by 
Australian courts from cases decided  in the United Kingdom and New Zealand which concern those provisions, 
as was observed in Bailey v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 113 by a Full Court of this Court, care must be 
observed in applying those authorities to the Australian section. While there are similarities in the comparable 
statutory provisions of those countries to s 115(4), there are also differences’). 
50 Report of the Copyright Law Review Committee 1959 (‘Spicer Committee’), para 309 
51 Autodesk Australia Inc v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 at 478. See also Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 
1067 at [31] 
52 Bailey v Namol Pty Limited (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 113-114;  Autodesk Inc v Yee (1996) 68 FCR 391 at 394;  
Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (2007) 157 FCR 564; (2007) 239 ALR 
702 at [42];  Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569 at [33]-[36] Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd v 
Tonnex International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] 312 ALR 705 at [38] .   
53 As a remedy they are recognized as sui generis: See Autodesk Inc v Yee (1996) 68 FCR 391 at 394; (1996) 139 
ALR 735 at 738–9, Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [36]: Truong Giang 
Corporation v Quach [2015] FCA 1097. 
54 Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012 FCAFC 9 at [89] 
55 Sullivan v FNH Investments Pty Ltd t/as Palm Bay Hideaway (2003) 57 IPR 63; [2003] FCA 323 at [101] 
(confirmed in FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [23]). 
56 Concrete Systems Pty Ltd v Devon Symonds Holdings Pty Ltd (1978) 20 SASR 79 at 85; Deckers Outdoor 
Corporation Inc v Farley (No 5) [2009] FCA 1298 at [114] and the cases there cited 
57 Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 at 479-80 
58 Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 93; Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] 
FCA 1067 at [31]; Sullivan v FNH Investments Pty Ltd t/as Palm Bay Hideaway (2003) 57 IPR 63; [2003] FCA 323 
at [100] (confirmed in FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [23]). 
The Legislative Basis for Awarding Additional Damages 
The first provision allowing courts to award additional damages for intellectual property 
infringements appeared in Australia in 1968 with the passage of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) which 
repealed and replaced the Copyright Act 1912 (Cth) – which had contained no such provision. 
The inclusion of that provision implemented a recommendation in the Copyright Law Review 
Committee’s 1959 Report (the ‘Spicer Report’) which had recommended that Australia adopt (inter 
alia) a provision similar to s 17(3) of the then Copyright Act 1956 (UK).59 It imposed a form of 
punitive damages for flagrant infringement of copyright rights. The Spicer Report noted (at para 309) 
that:  
Section 17(3) [of the UK Act] enables a court, in an action for infringement to grant exemplary 
damages where it thinks such a remedy is appropriate having regard to the flagrancy of the 
infringement and any benefit accruing to the infringer. We approve of a provision to this 
effect. It may be particularly useful in the case of the performing right where the event has 
occurred and the loss is difficult to assess in precise money terms. 
The UK provision read: 
(3) Where in an action under this section an infringement of copyright is proved or admitted, 
and the court, having regard (in addition to all other material considerations) to— 
(a) the flagrancy of the infringement, and 
(b) any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant by reason of the infringement, 
is satisfied that effective relief would not otherwise be available to the plaintiff, the court, in 
assessing damages for the infringement, shall have power to award such additional damages 
by virtue of this subsection as the court may consider appropriate in the circumstances.  
Section 115(4) of the new Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) largely followed its UK equivalent though with 
slightly different wording, the one significant difference being that under the Australian provision 
there was no requirement that the court be ‘satisfied that effective relief would not otherwise be 
available to the plaintiff’. Importantly it provided that the court, when deciding whether to award 
additional damages and, if so, in what sum, should have regard to the same three matters – the 
flagrancy of the infringement, any benefit that had accrued to the defendant by reason of the 
infringement and ‘all other material considerations’. 
The new s 115 provided that: 
 (1) Subject to this Act, the owner of a copyright may bring an action for an infringement of 
the copyright. 
(2) Subject to this Act, the relief that a court may grant in an action for an infringement of 
copyright includes an injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit) and 
either damages or an account of profits. 
                                                             
59 It was subsequently repealed and replaced by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), s 97(2) of 
which preserved the courts’ ability to award additional damages. That sub-section reads: ‘The court may in an 
action for infringement of copyright having regard to all the circumstances, and in particular to- 
(a) the flagrancy of the infringement, and 
(b) any benefit accruing to the defendant by reason of the infringement, 
award such additional damages as the justice of the case may require’. 
  (3) Where, in an action for infringement of copyright, it is established that an infringement 
was committed but it is also established that, at the time of the infringement, the defendant 
was not aware, and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting, that the act constituting the 
infringement was an infringement of the copyright, the plaintiff is not entitled under this 
section to any damages against the defendant in respect of the infringement, but is entitled to 
an account of profits in respect of the infringement whether any other relief is granted under 
this section or not. 
  (4) Where, in an action under this section- 
  (a)  an infringement of copyright is established; and 
  (b)  the court is satisfied that it is proper to do so, having regard to- 
    (i)  the flagrancy of the infringement; 
  (ii)  any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant by reason of the infringement; 
and 
      (iii)  all other relevant matters, 
the court may, in assessing damages for the infringement, award such additional damages as 
it considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
Sub-section 4(b) was subsequently amended  in 2000 (by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) 
Act 2000 (Cth) - Act 110 of 2000) specifically to allow courts to take into account situations where 
the infringement included the conversion of a work from hardcopy or analog form to digital or other 
electronic machine-readable form. 
The amended subsection (4) read: 
 (4)  Where, in an action under this section: 
                     (a)  an infringement of copyright is established; and 
                     (b)  the court is satisfied that it is proper to do so, having regard to: 
                              (i)  the flagrancy of the infringement; and 
(ii)  whether the infringement involved the conversion of a work or other 
subject-matter from hardcopy or analog form into a digital or other electronic 
machine-readable form; and 
(iii)  any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant by reason of the 
infringement; and 
                            (iv)  all other relevant matters; 
the court may, in assessing damages for the infringement, award such additional damages as 
it considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
Section 115(4)(b) was amended again in 2003 (by the Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) 
Act 2003 (Cth)), to add a number of additional matters to which the court could have regard when 
considering whether it was ‘proper’ to award additional damages.  
The Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum accompanying that Act noted that: 
‘The amendments encourage courts hearing civil matters to consider the assessment and 
award of additional damages for serious infringement. Australian copyright law allows 
“additional damages‟ to punish or make an example of undesirable conduct. The courts can 
currently award additional damages for infringement in certain circumstances the main 
element being “flagrancy‟. Two further factors, deterrence of similar infringements of 
copyright and the defendant’s conduct subsequent to becoming aware of alleged 
infringements, are now added to the list of factors to be considered in the award of additional 
damages. This approach effectively targets and penalises serious copyright infringement and 
avoids potential arbitrary application of alternative deterrent approaches such as fixed 
statutory amounts’.  
The revised sub-section 4 then read: 
  (4)  Where, in an action under this section: 
(a)  an infringement of copyright is established; and 
(b)  the court is satisfied that it is proper to do so, having regard to: 
(i)    the flagrancy of the infringement; and 
(ia)  the need to deter similar infringements of copyright; and 
(ib)  the conduct of the defendant after the act constituting the infringement or, 
if relevant, after the defendant was informed that the defendant had 
allegedly infringed the plaintiff’s copyright; and 
(ii)   whether the infringement involved the conversion of a work or other 
subject-matter from hardcopy or analog form into a digital or other 
electronic machine-readable form; and 
(iii)  any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant by reason of the 
infringement; and 
(iv)  all other relevant matters; 
the court may, in assessing damages for the infringement, award such additional damages as 
it considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
That wording remains, unchanged, in the Copyright Act today. 
Designs: For designs a provision similar to s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), at least in intent 
if not in wording, can be found in s 75(3) of the Designs Act 2003 (Cth)60. That inclusion of that 
                                                             
60 Commenced 17 June 2004. 
provision in the (then) new Designs Act 2003 (Cth) was the first time additional damages were 
included in the available remedies for infringement of design rights; there had been no equivalent 
provision in previous Act, the Designs Act 1906 (Cth).  Although the Designs Act 2003 (Cth) was 
passed after the 2000 amendments to the Copyright Act, its s  75(3) was, and still is, substantially 
shorter and less directive than s 115(4)(b) for determining when the courts should consider 
additional damages for an infringement. This appears to have been deliberate and a direct 
consequence of the fact that including s 75(3) was as the result of parliament accepting a 
recommendation in the Australian Law Reforms Commission’s Report in 1995 (ie before the 2000 
and 2003 amendments to s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)) that: 
 Provision should be made for additional damages in cases of flagrant infringement in terms 
similar to the Copyright Act s115(4). (emphasis added)61 
As passed, s 75(3) read (and still reads) simply: 
(3) The court may award such additional damages as it considers appropriate, having regard to 
the flagrancy of the infringement and all other relevant matters.  
 
Why there should have been this significant difference between the two provisions – and why it 
should remain unchanged (especially as the subsequent insertion of ‘additional damages’ provision 
in the other two main intellectual property statutes closely followed the post-2003 wording in s 
115(4)(b) of the Copyright Act is not clear.62 Paragraph 119 of the Revised Explanatory Memorandum 
simply noted that: ‘The court will also be able to award additional damages where the infringement 
is flagrant (subclause 75(3))’. 
Patents: For patents, a new sub-section (1A), with wording similar to the post-2003 wording of s 
115(4)(b) of the Copyright Act,  was inserted into s 122 of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) in 2006 by the 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 2006 (Cth). Section 122, which has not been further 
amended, reads: 
122 Relief for infringement of patent 
(1)  The relief which a court may grant for infringement of a patent includes an injunction 
(subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit) and, at the option of the plaintiff, either 
damages or an account of profits. 
(1A)  A court may include an additional amount in an assessment of damages for an 
infringement of a patent, if the court considers it appropriate to do so having regard to: 
(a)  the flagrancy of the infringement; and 
(b)  the need to deter similar infringements of patents; and 
(c)  the conduct of the party that infringed the patent that occurred: 
                                                             
61 Australian Law Reform Commission Report 74 – Designs, Recommendation 151.  
62 Interestingly, the March 2015 Final Report of the Australian Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) ‘Review 
of the Designs System’, which had been commissioned by the then Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus QC, in May 
2012, made no comment on the obvious disparity between the Designs Act ‘additional damages’ provision and 
the its equivalents in the other three main intellectual property statutes.  
  (i)  after the act constituting the infringement; or 
  (ii)  after that party was informed that it had allegedly infringed the patent; and 
(d)  any benefit shown to have accrued to that party because of the infringement; and 
(e)  all other relevant matters. 
(2)  On the application of either party, the court may make such order for the inspection of 
any thing in or on any vehicle, vessel, aircraft or premises, and may impose such terms and 
give such directions about the inspection, as the court thinks fit. 
Trade Marks: For trade marks there was no provision for additional damages until 15 April 2013 
when the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth) inserted s 126(2) 
into the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). Section 126(2) reads: 
(2)  A court may include an additional amount in an assessment of damages for an 
infringement of a registered trade mark, if the court considers it appropriate to do so 
having regard to: 
(a)  the flagrancy of the infringement; and 
(b)  the need to deter similar infringements of registered trade marks; and 
(c)  the conduct of the party that infringed the registered trade mark that occurred: 
  (i)  after the act constituting the infringement; or 
(ii)  after that party was informed that it had allegedly infringed the registered trade 
mark; and 
(d)  any benefit shown to have accrued to that party because of the infringement; and 
(e)  all other relevant matters. 
The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the amending Act gave the following explanation for 
the change: 
‘This item amends section 126 to give a court the discretion to award additional damages if 
the court considers it appropriate to do so. 
Additional damages (also known as punitive or exemplary damages) are available for flagrant 
infringement of patents, registered designs, and copyright. However, additional damages are 
not currently available for trade mark infringement. This limits the ability of a court to mark its 
disapproval of the blatant violation of the trade mark owner’s personal property rights under 
the Trade Marks Act.  
Additionally, stakeholders have submitted that many counterfeiters do not maintain sufficient 
business records to enable a satisfactory calculation of ordinary damages or an account of 
profits: purely nominal damages may be regarded by counterfeiters as merely the ‘cost of 
doing business’, rather than an effective deterrent. The absence of additional damages under 
the Trade Marks Act limits the ability of a court to provide an effective deterrent to intentional 
counterfeiting’. 
The amendment remedies these problems by giving the court the discretion to award 
additional damages. This aligns the remedies for trade mark infringement with other forms of 
intellectual property. It permits the court to provide a substantial deterrent and to mark its 
disapproval of flagrant infringement. 
Consistent with the additional damages provisions in other IP legislation, the power to award 
additional damages is discretionary. The courts will therefore have sufficient flexibility to 
ensure that additional damages are only awarded in appropriate circumstances. In exercising 
its discretion, a court would have regard to all relevant matters. Consistent with the approach 
in the Patents Act, there is also a list of specific factors to assist the courts as to when it may 
be appropriate to award additional damages. 
Circuit Layouts: Section 27(4) of the Circuit Layouts Act 1989 (Cth) also provides for the award of 
additional damages in terms that are almost identical to the original wording of s 115(4) of the 
Copyright Act. It was included in the Act as passed63 and reads: 
(4) Where, in an action for infringement of EL rights64: 
 
(a) an infringement is established; and 
 
(b) the court is satisfied that it is proper to do so, having regard to: 
 
(i) the flagrancy of the infringement; 
 
(ii) any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant because of the infringement; and 
 
(iii) all other relevant matters; 
 
the court may, in assessing damages for the infringement, award such additional damages as 
it considers appropriate in the circumstances. 
As paragraph 53 of the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying that Act makes clear, this similarity 
with the original Copyright Act provision was deliberate. It simply noted that: 
Consistent with the copyright style of protection afforded by the Bill, these provisions are very 
similar to provisions in the Copyright Act 1968.  
Plant Breeders Rights: It is perhaps surprising that there is no equivalent provision in the Plant 
Breeders Rights Act 1994 (Cth) – despite it being passed some five years after the Circuit Layouts Act 
1989 (Cth). The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill makes no reference at all to why 
the powers that s 56 confers on the court should not include power to award additional damages 
and the only reference in the document to anything potentially relevant is the notation in para 11 
(dealing with the Financial Impact of the Bill) that: 
                                                             
63 Commenced 21 December 1990. 
64 The term ‘EL rights’ refers to eligible layout rights and is defined in s 5 of the Act as ‘the exclusive rights 
specified in section 17 in relation to an eligible layout’. 
This potential [for cost to the government] is small because the legislation retains its non-
adversarial nature and alternative dispute resolution provisions of the Plant Variety Rights Act 
1987.  
Consequently, s 56(3) of the Act simply provides: 
 (3) The relief that the Federal Court may grant in an action or proceeding for infringement of 
PBR includes an injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the Federal Court thinks fit) and, 
at the option of the plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits. 
 
The Relationship between ‘Normal’ Compensatory Damages and Additional Damages that 
are Available under the Acts 
The start point in any discussion of the relationship between additional damages and the general 
damages that can be awarded under the Acts is recognising that the two remedies are designed to 
achieve two different purposes. As the court noted in Hugo Boss Trade Mark Management GmbH & 
Co Kg v Sasalili Oxford Fia [2014] FCA 1328 at [14] (citing Halal Certification Authority Pty Limited v 
Scadilone Pty Limited [2014] FCA 614 at [99]): 
‘…  it is clear that additional damages are to operate as a deterrent and to make 
infringement unattractive, not to compensate an applicant’s loss’. 
Interestingly however, especially given that s 115 of the Copyright Act, which includes both the 
general damages provision and the additional damages provision, has been part of the Copyright Act 
(and that, therefore, by extension they have been part of the available remedies for intellectual 
property infringements), sInce the Copyright Act was passed in 1968, the relationship between the 
two types of damages was not subject to judicial interpretation in Australia until 1997 when it was 
dealt with in Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565.65  
In that case Lockhart J, having found no previous authority, went on to say that, in his view, provided 
the plaintiff had sought (and was granted) any form of relief under s 115 – whether damages, an 
injunction or declaratory relief66 - additional damages could be awarded (provided the formal 
requirements of s 115(4) were also met). Accordingly, as he had already determined that nominal 
damages should be awarded, he held that additional damages could also be awarded. 
An exactly similar outcome was reached in Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 
2) (2008) 76 IPR 763 where Bersanko J said (at [17]): ‘In relation to the claim for additional damages 
under s 115(4) of the Act … there is no need for me to consider if an award of additional damages 
can be made under s 115(4) if no damages are awarded under s 115(2) because I have awarded 
nominal damages under s 115(2) (Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (No 2) 38 IPR 451 at 
459-461 per Lockhart J; MJA Scientifics at 283-284 per Sundberg J)’. 
                                                             
65 See (at 573): ‘The researches of counsel and myself have not revealed any other case where the point has 
been decided’. 
66 Whilst declaratory relief is not specifically provided for in s 115(2) the section merely states that the relief 
that may be awarded ‘includes an injunction … and either damages or an account of profits’. A declaration is 
not excluded and declarations have in fact been made in appropriate cases. See Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden 
Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565, Dynamic Supplies Pty Limited v Tonnex International Pty Limited (No 2) 
[2011] FCA 675 at [14] and Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd 
(2012) 211 FCR 563; [2012] FCA 779 at [202].  
This did however leave open the question of whether additional damages can be awarded ‘if no 
damages are awarded under [the general damages provision]’ – as well as the broader question of 
whether additional damages could be awarded if the principal remedy was not damages but an 
injunction and/or an account of profits instead. 
Those question arose for decision in Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] 
FCAFC 9 where, referring to Bersanko J’s judgment in  Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels 
Pty Ltd (No 2), Lander and Gordon JJ stated (erroneously) at [30] that Bersanko J had said that he 
‘did not feel it necessary to determine whether an owner of a copyright could be entitled to 
additional damages without first proving an entitlement to either damages of an account of profits 
under s 115(2)’ (emphasis added). In fact he did not refer (and was not required to refer to any 
remedy under s 115(2) except damages – because he had already decided to award damages, albeit 
nominal damages, and therefore did not need to consider any other situation. 
In Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd, even though, again, they were not required to decide the point 
(because compensatory damages under s 115(2) were awarded)67 Lander and Gordon JJ went on to 
say, regarding whether the ‘additional damages’ provisions could apply when general damages were 
not awarded (their comment clearly being obiter): 
 ’31 Section 115(4) speaks of additional damages. It must mean additional to some other 
damages. The only other damages to which it could refer are damages awarded under s 
115(2). Whilst an award can be made under s 115(2) which does not reflect damages but 
reflects an account of profits, that would not allow an owner to seek additional damages 
under s 115(4) because a claim for additional damages does not lie where an owner has 
sought an account of profits: Redrow Homes Ltd v Bett Brothers plc [1999] 1 AC 197 at 209 
per Lord Clyde; Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd at 
568 per Black CJ and Jacobsen J’.   
32 An owner of copyright would not be entitled to additional damages under s 115(4) 
without first making out an entitlement to damages under s 115(2). This is so because of the 
use of the words ‘additional damages’ in s 115(4), and also because s 115(4) speaks of ‘non-
compensatory damages. If a defendant has infringed an owner’s copyright but not caused 
the owner any damage it is unlikely that the Court would think there was any need for any 
pecuniary damages. However the authorities appear to recognise that s 115(4) may be 
engaged when the owner is entitled only to to nominal damages under s 115(2); Aristocrat 
Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd . This is not a case of that 
kind so no further consideration needs to be given to that circumstance.’ 
 
What Lord Clyde had said in Redrow Homes Ltd v Bett Brothers plc [1999] 1 AC 197; [1998] 1 All ER 
385; at 209; at 391-93, (referring to the equivalent provision in the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 (UK) was: 
‘My Lords, this appeal concerns the construction of the words 'additional damages' in s 97(2) 
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Either it is intended to refer to an addition 
to an award of damages, or it is intended to constitute a self-standing remedy. As was 
recognised both in the Outer House and in the Inner House persuasive arguments can be 
presented for either view and the decision is not altogether easy. Despite the careful 
presentation of the argument for the appellants, fortified as it was by the judgment of 
Laddie J in Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Alfred McAlpine Homes (East) Ltd (No 2) [1996] FSR 36 I 
                                                             
67 Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [31]  
have come to the view that the result reached by the Second Division [that it is not a self-
standing remedy] is to be preferred. There are four considerations which have moved me to 
that opinion. 
In the first place the language used in the statute seems to me to point to the understanding 
that what is intended in s 97(2) is an enhancement of an award of damages and not the 
provision of a self-standing remedy. … . 
Secondly, it seems to me that Ch VI of the Act … sets out a statutory code for the remedies 
for infringement of copyright. … The provision in s 97(1) is tied in as part of the scheme and 
does not constitute a separate remedy.  
In the third place, it seems to me quite clear that additional damages under the earlier 
legislation, s 17 of the Copyright Act 1956, were intended to be an enhancement of an award 
of ordinary damages. … Those words have not been copied in the later form of the 
legislation in s 97 of the 1988 Act. But the significance which might otherwise have been 
attributed to the disappearance of those words in the 1988 Act is materially diminished by 
the provisions of s 172. That section explains that Pt I of the Act … is restating and amending 
the law of copyright. It then provides expressly in sub-s (2) that a provision of Pt I which 
corresponds to a provision of the previous law is not to be construed as departing from the 
previous law merely because of a change of expression. … The intention was plainly not only 
to amend but also to restate the former law, in what was no doubt hoped to be clearer 
language, and to preserve the existing jurisprudence.  
Finally, I accept that … a distinction can be drawn between a 'benefit accruing to the 
defendant' …  and the net profits which the defender might earn by the infringement. The 
latter would be caught by an action for accounting, but the former could extend to such 
matters as the acquisition of an enhanced position in the market which would not be 
included in a calculation of the net profits. But this additional content for the word 'benefit' 
does not seem to me to justify the conclusion that an award under s 97(2) was intended to 
be available when the pursuer opted to claim an accounting. … That the remedy of an award 
under s 97(2) may not be available as an addition to an accounting of profits is wholly 
consistent with the basic principle that an award for damages is inconsistent with an 
accounting. … I am not persuaded that Parliament intended to innovate upon the basic 
principle and allow a claim of this kind to be pursued alongside an accounting’.  
In Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (2007) 157 FCR 564; 
(2007) 239 ALR 702 Black CJ and Jacobsen J were more succinct simply saying at [24]: ‘Here, 
Aristocrat elected to claim damages, perhaps because additional damages under s 115(4) do not lie 
where an account of profits is claimed’. 
The proposition that additional damages cannot be awarded unless there has been at least some 
award of compensatory damages under the general remedies provision also appears to have been 
accepted without argument by the parties in the much earlier decision, Polygram Editions v Golden 
Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 573, where Lockhart J commented: ‘Although the applicants 
elected to pursue damages under s 115(2), at one stage of the case the applicants did not press this 
claim. … towards the end of the case the applicants revived their claim and sought nominal damages 
under s 115(2) in addition to conversion damages. The applicants’ reasons for persisting with this 
claim will become apparent when I deal with the additional damages issue’ (emphasis added). At 574 
he then explained that allusion saying: ‘… it is my view, as at present advised, that “if only nominal 
damages are claimed and awarded under subs (2), the Court is entitled to make an award of 
additional damages under subs (4) provided, of course, the necessary preconditions upon which the 
award may be founded and prescribed by par (a) and (b) of subs (4) are satisfied’. 
He also noted (also at 574), while first noting that it was ‘not strictly necessary to decide the point in 
this case’68 (because he had already decided to award nominal damages under s 115(2)),  that ‘If the 
owner of a copyright seeks injunctive relief under s 115(2) and conversion damages under s 116, but 
not compensatory damages under subs (2), my present view is that the Court would still be 
empowered to make an award of additional damages under subs (4).’  
In addition to that comment clearly being obiter, His Honour did not refer to the House of Lords 
decision in Redrow Homes Ltd v Bett Brothers plc [1999] 1 AC 197; [1998] 1 All ER 385 (or, indeed any 
possibly relevant authorities) and, given its apparent inconsistency with the reasoning in Redrow, 
which was later accepted and relied upon by the Full Federal Court in Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty 
Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9, it is unlikely to be correct. Before additional damages can 
be awarded in conjunction with an injunction there must also be an award of at least nominal 
damages under the general damages provisions. 
The same would also seem to apply in relation to copyright infringements69 if the plaintiff has sought 
and been awarded damages for conversion. The opening words of s 115(4) of the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth) (and of the equivalent provisions in the other Acts) read, 'Where, in an action under this 
section –‘. They therefore preclude additional damages being awarded unless the action was taken 
under s 115. In a practical sense this is not a major limitation because as in Polygram Editions v 
Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 a plaintiff can seek and be awarded both conversion 
damages and damages under s 115 (subject to the limitation that they may not overlap70) – so 
additional damages can be awarded even where the plaintiff has primarily sought conversion 
damages under s 116. 
The net result then is that for a plaintiff to be awarded additional damages the Court must also have 
awarded compensatory damages under the general remedies provision – irrespective of how small 
that award might be. Other remedies, including those specifically mentioned in the general remedies 
section or other (such as a declaration) which are not specifically included,71 will not allow an award 
of additional damages to be made – unless there is also an award of compensatory damages under 
the section.72  
                                                             
68 His Honour said: ‘I talk of my present view because it is not strictly necessary to decide the point in this 
case’. 
69 There are no equivalents of s 116 of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) in the other intellectual property statutes. 
70 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116(1C) and, for a more general statement of principle, Polygram Pty Ltd v 
Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 577 and Fraserside Holdings v Venus Adult Shops (2005) 222 ALR 
388 at [59]. 
71 See, for example, Lockhart J in Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 575: ‘The 
owner of a copyright may bring an action for infringement of copyright (s 115(1). The Court may grant various 
forms of relief including those mentioned in subs (2), …. The relief mentioned in subs (2) is by way of inclusion 
and is not exhaustive of the Court’s powers. The Court may also grant declaratory relief’. 
72 This does not, however, appear to affect the plaintiff’s rights in relation to a possible award of additional 
damages during preparation for trial. For example, in SNF (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ciba Speciality Chemicals Water 
Treatment Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 845 at [12] Davies J held that Ciba could seek discovery of documents that 
could bear on an additional damages claim even though it had not then elected whether it would seek 
damages or an account – on the basis that ‘Ciba is not yet obliged to make an election and this class of 
documents is relevant in aid Ciba of making an election on an informed basis: LED Builders Pty Ltd v Eagle 
Homes Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 436; Tivo Inc v Vivo International Corp Pty Ltd No 3) [2013] FCA 797. (In LED 
Builders Pty Ltd v Eagle Homes Pty Ltd (1996) 70 FCR 436 Lindgren J had said (at 450): ‘In the ordinary case, the 
owner of copyright or other intellectual property will be able to be adequately informed prior to the hearing, 
for the purpose of making its election, by the interlocutory procedures of discovery and, if appropriate, the 
administration of interrogatories, or by other means referred to in the cases discussed earlier’). See also Tivo 
Inc v Vivo International Corporation Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 797 at [45] 
 
The ‘Rules’ for Awarding Additional Damages 
The statutes make it clear that: 
a. additional damages may (not must) be awarded; 
b. if ‘the court is satisfied that it is proper to do so’; 
c. having regard to the specified considerations; and 
d. in such amount as the court ‘considers appropriate in the circumstances’. 
The principal consideration then is, whether the court considers it ‘proper’ to award additional 
damages having had regard to the considerations that are set out in the Acts.73   
In determining when it is ‘proper’ to award additional damages and what amounts are ‘appropriate 
in the circumstances’, the courts have developed their own jurisprudence which has involved both 
interpreting the statutory provisions and developing other rules to assist in deciding when it would 
be ‘proper to award such damages and what quantum would be ‘appropriate in the circumstances’.  
Much of that jurisprudence has been derived from cases involving infringements of copyright (the 
statute with the longest history of additional damages as a remedy) but it is well accepted that the 
principles that have been developed in the copyright context are equally applicable to awards of 
additional damages under the other statutes. See, for example Review Australia v Innovative 
Lifestyle (2008) 166 FCR 358 at [53] (in relation to a design infringement74) and Truong Giang 
Corporation v Quach [2015] FCA 1097 at [132] (in relation to a trade marks infringement). See also, 
Pacific Enterprises (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bernen Pty Ltd (2014) 321 ALR 715; [2014] FCA 1372 (a case 
involving patent infringement) where Pagone J noted at [13] that s 122(1A) had only recently been 
introduced ‘and has received limited judicial consideration,’ before drawing analogies with cases 
involving additional damages for infringements of copyright, trade marks and design rights.75  
Rules Relating to Whether it is Proper to Award Additional Damages 
Rule 1 
Punishment: Consistent with the accepted difference between compensatory damages and 
additional damages, additional damages are awarded to punish and deter the infringer (and others) 
from committing further infringement. Compensation is therefore not a consideration to be taken 
into account in determining whether it is proper to award additional damages. 
Rule 2 
Compliance with the Acts pre-conditions: Additional damages can only be awarded if the conditions 
in the relevant section are met. As Gowans J said in See Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd [1977] VR 65 
at 69; (1975) 29 FLR 59 at 64; (1975) ALR 685 at 689: ‘… before additional damages can be awarded 
under s 115 it would be necessary for the plaintiff to establish the conditions which enable the court 
to assess such damages. The material condition is that set out in par (b) of s 115(4) …’. He then went 
                                                             
73 Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 574 per Lockhart J 
74 Though the Court there acknowledged that the specific matters that were required to be taken into account 
under the Designs Act 2003 (Cth) were different to those that were required to be taken into account under 
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
75 See also Zetco Pty Ltd v Austworld Commodities Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 848 at [267] per Bennett J, 
Australian Mud Company Pty Ltd v Coretell Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 1372 at [426], both also involving patent 
infringement, where analogous decisions involving other areas of intellectual property were applied.. 
 
on to say:  ‘I have come to the conclusion that the evidence as to the publication shows primarily a 
case of mistake and perhaps carelessness, but it does not show a case of flagrancy or calculated 
disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, or cynical pursuit of benefit, or other matter justifying the award of 
additional damages going beyond what is required for compensation’ (emphasis added).  
See also Review 2 Pty Ltd (in liq) v Redberry Enterprise Pty Ltd (2008) 173 FCR 450 where Kenny J 
refused to award additional damages for an alleged design infringement, because the relevant pre-
conditions had not been made out, saying at [84]: ‘If Redberry infringed, its conduct in importing and 
selling the Redberry garments … was in ignorance of Review 2’s design rights and at a time when the 
existence of such rights had only briefly been a matter of public record. …’ 
Rule 3 
Onus of proof: The onus of proving the existence of those conditions is on the plaintiff and ‘There 
must be something more than is sufficient to justify a possible view of the defendant’s conduct, it 
must be sufficient to establish a persuasive conclusion’: Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd [1977] VR 65 
at 69; (1975) 29 FLR 59 at 64; (1975) ALR 685 at 689. 
Rule 4 
Not all of the sub-sections’ conditions must be satisfied: While the Courts must have regard to all of 
the matters set down in the relevant provision – not all must apply to the infringement before 
additional damages can be awarded (ie the factors to which a court must have regard under s 115(4) 
are not cumulative in the sense that they must all be satisfied). The principle was stated by 
Tamberlin J in Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 103 in an often 
cited passage. He noted: ‘If the court is satisfied that one or more of the circumstances set out in in 
subs (4)(b) are present, it has a discretion to award such damages as it considers appropriate’). That 
principle has been consistently applied, since.76   
Rule 5 
Additional damages are related to exemplary and aggravated damages. As additional damages are 
intended to punish and deter, additional damages may be awarded on principles corresponding to 
those governing awards of aggravated and exemplary damages at common law.77  
Rule 6 
They are however a remedy sui generis: While ‘the circumstances which are relevant to an 
assessment of aggravated damages and exemplary damages will be relevant in some cases in 
considering additional damages under this section … in the end result the damages to be awarded 
are not exemplary or aggravated damages but additional damages, being of a type sui generis’ 
                                                             
76 See Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 575; Sony Entertainment (Australia) Ltd 
v Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788 at [158] per Jacobsen J, Norm Engineering v Digga Austraklia (2007) 162 FCR 1 at 
79 ; Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 76 IPR 763 at [17]; Dynamic Supplies 
Pty Ltd v Tonnex International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] 312 ALR 705 at [44]. 
77 See, for example, Bailey v Namol Pty Limited (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 113-114;  Autodesk Inc v Yee (1996) 68 
FCR 391 at 394;  Sullivan v FNH Investments Pty Ltd t/as Palm Bay Hideaway (2003) 57 IPR 63; [2003] FCA 323 
at [95] (confirmed in FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [23]; Woolworths v Olsen (2004) 
184 FLR 121 at [343]; Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (2007) 157 FCR 
564 at [42];  Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569 at [33]-[36]; Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd v 
Tonnex International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] 312 ALR 705 at [38]. 
(emphasis added).78 This has two consequences. First, the fact that the ‘principles governing awards 
of aggravated damages and exemplary damages at common law may inform the question as to 
whether additional damages should be awarded’79 - not that they ‘must inform’ that question. This 
means that awards of additional damages are not constrained by common law principles that might 
restrict awards of exemplary and aggravated damages.80  Secondly, while the sections do lay down 
particular considerations to which the courts must have regard it is a non-exclusive list so courts 
have a wide discretion in relation to the matters they can consider81- a matter reinforced by the 
inclusion in the listing of the matters to which courts are to have regard, ‘all other relevant matters’.  
Rule 7 
Additional damages are ‘not limited to cases in which the conventional remedies, including 
compensatory damages, are insufficient to redress the wrong suffered by the copyright holder’.82 
They are ‘a head of relief independent of and not dependent upon whatever form of financial relief 
the plaintiff seeks …’83 though, of course, the amount awarded may in appropriate cases, be 
influenced by the amount of any compensatory damages;84 if they are great the additional damages 
may be reduced85 while, on the other hand, if they are small, a larger sum of additional damages 
may be required to punish and deter.86 
  
                                                             
78 Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [36]. See also Truong Giang 
Corporation v Quach [2015] FCA 1097. 
79 Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Lucky Homes Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1217 at [242] per Beach J. See also Autodesk Inc v Yee 
(1996) 68 FCR 391 at 394 per Burchett J and Lamb v Cotongo (1987) 164 CLR 1 at 9-10 per Mason CJ, Brennan, 
Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ) 
80 So, for example in FHN Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [26]-[27] even though there was a 
contractual relationship between the parties the fact ‘that exemplary damages are, at best, only awarded in 
rare cases involving a breach of contract’ was considered irrelevant. The court noted (at [26]) that ‘No such 
limitation is imposed by the subsection. Nor should it be implied given that the Act is intended to afford 
owners of the statutory rights … a number of statutory remedies to protect or vindicate those rights’. Similarly, 
even though Australian courts are not bound by the limitations which Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 
imposed on awards of exemplary damages (see Uren v John Fairfax & Sons Pty Limited (1966) 117 CLR 118, 
affirmed in Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1967) 117 CLR 185), if they were, those limitations would 
not apply to awards of additional damages. 
81 Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [36]. 
82 Autodesk Australia Inc v Cheung(1990) 94 ALR 472 at 478. See also Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 
1067 at [31]; Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 76 IPR 763 at [17] (upheld on 
appeal, see Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 2). 
83 Cala Homes (South) Limited v Alfred McAlpine Homes East Limited (No 2) 23 [1996] FSR 36 at 43 per Laddie J. 
84 See, for example Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (2007) 157 FCR 
564 at [52] per Black CJ and Jacobsen J: ‘The very nature of ‘additional’ damages … suggest that an amount 
awarded may depend on the sufficiency or otherwise of the compensatory damages …’ (emphasis added).  
85 See, for example Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 269 at 
286-287 where Wilcox J declined to award additional damages because of the already significant 
compensatory damages: ‘… had compensatory damages not justified an award as high as $3 million, I would 
have imposed additional damages to take the award to that figure}. 
86 See, for example Pacific Enterprises (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bernen Pty Ltd (2014) 321 ALR 715; [2014] FCA 
1372 at [15] per Pagone J: ‘… The amount awarded as damages may also be relevant when assessing 
the additional amount to be awarded under s 122(1A). A relatively small amount obtained as 
damages may, in some cases, be thought insufficient to reflect the sanction appropriate to the 
flagrancy of the infringement or to deter similar infringements. …’ See also Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty 
Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 278; 130 ALR 659 at 693. 
Rule 8 
Additional damages may be awarded to indicate the Court’s disapproval of the defendant’s 
conduct:87 This was also the subject of specific comment in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Intellectual Property Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth) which included the new s 126(2) 
(dealing with the power to award additional damages) into the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth). The 
Explanatory Memorandum gave as one of its express reasons for the new inclusion the fact that not 
having the ability to award additional damages ‘limits the ability of a court to mark its disapproval of 
the blatant violation of the Trade Mark owner’s personal property rights under the bTrade Marks 
Act’ (emphasis added). From the case, it seems that using an award of additional damages to 
indicate the court’s disapproval id often coupled with an expressed need to provide some form of 
substantial deterrent.  
Rule 9 
Fault on the plaintiff’s part will not prevent an award of additional damages. This appears to apply 
particularly where it relates to commencing enforcement proceedings and it will not necessarily 
affect either the availability of amount of additional damages.88  
Rule 10 
Additional damages must be clearly included in the claim: This is to ensure that the defendant has 
an opportunity to respond adequately. This means, in most cases, that the pleadings must include 
the claim and the ‘facts, matters and circumstances upon which [the applicant] intended to rely to 
justify such a claim’.89 If they are not clearly included in the claim they will not be awarded. 
 
Rules Relating to the ‘Appropriate’ Quantum of Additional Damages 
Rule 1 
Additional damages are ‘at large: In the context of additional damages this means no more than it 
does in relation to damages generally – that the amount to be awarded is ‘to be the subject of 
exhaustive analysis, but that the judge must do his or her best to settle upon an appropriate figure in 
light of all the available evidence’ (Australian Performing Right Association Limited v Riceboy Pty 
Limited [2011] FMCA 942 at [89]). Invariable this means that the assessment of additional damages 
will always depend on the particular circumstances of the case.90   
                                                             
87 See, for example, Bailey v Namol Pty Limited (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 113-114’, Sony Entertainment (Australia) 
Ltd v Smith (2005) 215 ALR 788; [2005] FCA 228 at [167]; Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 
569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [36]; Microsoft Corporation v Ezy Loans Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 54; [2004] FCA 1135 at 
[95] and Sullivan v FNH Investments Pty Ltd t/as Palm Bay Hideaway (2003) 57 IPR 63; [2003] FCA 323 at [103] 
(confirmed in FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [23]). 
88 See Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Tri-Star Pictures Inc v Luckins (1996) 34 IPR 504; [1996] FCA 1606 at 
[46] where Tamberlin J refused ‘to reduce the amount of additional damages to any significant extent’ just 
because ‘the damages arose from the substantial delay on the part of the applicants in commencing 
proceedings’. 
89 In the Matter of APT Technology Pty Ltd; APT Technology Pty Ltd v Aladesaye (No 2) [2016] FCA 203 at [137] 
(cf at [138]-[140] where additional damages were refused). See also Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (No 5) 
[2013] FCA 1006; (2013) 103 IPR 51 at [41] 
90 Eagle Rock Entertainment Ltd v Caisley [2005] FCA 1238 at [24] 
Rule 2 
The amount of additional damages is uniquely a matter for the Court: Allied to Rule 1 this means 
that the Court has a very wide discretion,91 it will ‘have regard to past awards…’92 but retains an 
unfettered discretion to determine awards of additional damages on the particular circumstances of 
each case. 
Rule 3 
Courts approach additional damages cautiously:  In this respect they treat awards of additional 
damages as they do awards of exemplary damages.93 It has, therefore, been held that the 
appropriate approach is to award a ‘moderate, but not excessive, sum’.94 This is especially the case 
‘When conversion damages have been awarded under s 116 and a claim is also made for additional 
damages under s 115(4), [when] the Court must be careful and approach the question of additional 
damages with a view to the additional damages not being immoderate95  - because both forms of 
damage involve a punitive element for what may be the same behaviour. 
Rule 4 
The assessment of additional damages may be arbitrary: As Wilcox J noted in Autodesk Australia 
Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 at 479-80: ‘Once again, any assessment must be arbitrary, in the 
sense that it is impossible to demonstrate its correctness by reference to provable fact’.  Other 
courts have referred to the calculation of additional damages as ‘of necessity, an imprecise 
exercise’96 or ‘by no means a precise science’.97 
Rule 5 
There is no requirement for proportionality between compensatory and additional damages:98 
This reflects both the different purposes to which the two forms of damages are directed and the 
unfettered nature of the Court’s power to award additional damages.99 In particular it applies in 
those cases where, for any reason, the courts are only able to award nominal damages under the 
compensatory damages provision but the circumstances are such that a significant award of  
                                                             
91 Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 103; Concrete Systems v Devon Symonds 
(1978) 20 SASR 79 at 85; Sullivan v FNH Investments Pty Ltd t/as Palm Bay Hideaway (2003) 57 IPR 63; [2003] 
FCA 323 at [101] (confirmed in FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [23]). 
92 Australian Performing Right Association Limited v Riceboy Pty Limited [2011] FMCA 942 at [28] 
93 See Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 577 
94 Nichols Advanced Vehicle Systems Inc v Rees (at 140) 
95 Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 57 
96 Sullivan v FNH Investments Pty Ltd t/as Palm Bay Hideaway (2003) 57 IPR 63; [2003] FCA 323 at [100] 
(confirmed in FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [23]). 
97 Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [85] 
98 Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 93; Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd v Tonnex 
International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] 312 ALR 705 at [52] 
99 Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc v Farley (No 5) [2009] FCA 1298 (at [114] 
additional damages are needed to punish and/or deter the infringer. 100 In this respect therefore 
additional damages are very much aligned with exemplary damages.101  
However, while there need not be proportionality, any additional damages that are awarded cannot 
be excessive in the context of the infringement and the harm the plaintiff has suffered.102 
Rule 6 
The impact on the infringer must be taken into account: Because the aim of additional 
damages is to punish and deter the infringer from further infringement the probable effect 
of the award on the infringer, including the burden that the award will impose, is a proper 
consideration to be taken into account in determining the ‘appropriateness’ of any award.103 
The application behind this ‘Rule’ is that it may properly be taken into account under the ‘all 
other relevant matters’ provision, its relevance being explained by Pagone J in Pacific 
Enterprises (Aust) Pty Ltd v Bernen Pty Ltd (2014) 321 ALR 715; [2014] FCA 1372 at [15]:  
 
‘The amount to be awarded under s 122(1A) should be felt as a sanction by the 
person on whom it is imposed and should also act as a deterrent to others. Those 
objectives require consideration of the specific circumstances of each case and each 
infringer. An amount which may be an effective sanction upon an infringer with 
limited means may be ineffective as a sanction, or as a deterrent, to a wealthy 
infringer or potential infringer. …’ 
Rule 7 
Additional damages will not be awarded if that would result in an ‘overlap’ of damages or a 
‘doubling up’: While most instance of overlap are likely to occur when compensatory damages are 
sought for an intellectual property infringement and also some for some allied wrong (a breach of 
contract, breach of confidence, or a tort such as conversion or passing off) it is possible that 
exemplary damages for those wrongs could overlap with additional damages under the intellectual 
property statutes. In some cases the factual basis underlying even compensatory damages (such as, 
for example, reputational damages) could intersect with the factual basis for a claim for additional 
damages.  
In such cases the courts are careful to ensure that there is no ‘doubling up. So, for example, in 
Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 Lander and Gordon JJ noted 
                                                             
100 See Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v DAP Services (Kempsey) Pty Ltd (in liq) (2007) 157 FCR 564; 
(2007) 239 ALR 702 at [54] and the cases there cited; see also Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels 
Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 746; (2008) IPR 763 at [17] and the cases there cited.   
101 See XL Petroleum (NSW) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448 at 471 per Brennan J: ‘As 
an award of exemplary damages is intended to punish the defendant for conduct showing a conscious and 
contumelious disregard for the plaintiff’s rights and to deter him from committing like conduct again … [t]here 
is no necessary proportionality between the assessment of the two categories’ (cited in Facton Ltd v Rifai 
Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [65]). 
102 See Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [45]: ‘… Although there need 
not be any proportionality between the amount of compensatory damages awarded under s 115(2) and the 
amount of additional damages awarded under s 115(4) … the sums sought by the appellants both on trial and 
on appeal are so disproportionate to the damage suffered that the claims must be rejected’. (emphasis added) 
103 Amalgamated Mining Services Pty Ltd v Warman International Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 269 at 286-287; Universal 
Music Australia Pty Ltd v Miyamoto [2004] FCA 982 at [22]-[23]; Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 
FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [46]; Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd v Tonnex International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] 312 ALR 
705 at [53]; Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Lucky Homes Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1217 at [256], [257]) and [263]. 
at [10] that: ‘… if the appellants receive both compensatory damages and additional damages under 
s 115 … they should not receive any further damages, including exemplary damages, for the tort of 
passing off’. 
In the same case Gilmour J said at [91]: ‘To the extent that damages are awarded under s 115(4) 
they cannot, by reliance on the same facts, be recovered, in addition, by way of exemplary damages. 
The converse is the same. Indeed an award under s 115(4) can encompass damages which, at 
common law, would be aggravated damages and exemplary damages: Futuretronics at [17]; Bailey v 
Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 102 at 113-14’. 
In relation to possible overlap in cases involving reputational damages it was noted in Australasian 
Performing Right Association Limited v Riceboy Pty Limited [2011] FMCA 942 (when referring to the 
sequence of Facton cases),104 that that could and should be taken into account. See, at [28]: ‘In each 
of those cases ‘reputational damages’ were also awarded. There is some overlap between additional 
damages and reputational damages, so that the real level of the award of additional damages in 
those cases was higher than the nominal level’. 
That does not prevent additional damages being awarded together with exemplary,  aggravated or 
even reputational damages provided there is appropriate justification and that is appropriate – as 
was the case in GM Holden v Paine [2011] FCA 569 where Gordon J awarded  $20,000 for 
reputational damage, $200,000 in exemplary damages for the passing off and also $10,000 in 
additional damages for the design infringement.  
Rule 8 
Additional damages may be reduced if the plaintiff has acquiesced in the infringing behaviour: This 
reflect the questions of both the degree of flagrancy and the requirement for deterrence – as well as 
the defendant’s culpability and, therefore the need to punish. So, for example, in Fraserside Holdings 
v Venus Adult Shops (2005) 222 ALR 388 at [60] it was held that because the plaintiff had become 
aware that the defendants had acquired some infringing copies by parallel importation and had 
advised them that they were not concerned with parallel imported DVDs but then sued in respect of 
them, the $100,000 additional damages that the Court would have awarded were reduced to 
$85,000. 
Rule 9 
Additional damages can be awarded for conduct in the period before the commencement of the 
relevant additional damages provision: This applies at least in respect of those statutes where the 
power to award additional damages was inserted after the Act’s commencement (so that a right to 
pursue an action for infringement and to claim damages already existed). This is because the new 
provision, which then simply changes the quantum or kind of damages, is regarded as procedural 
rather than substantive.105    
Rule 10 
‘An award of general damages will not be set aside on appeal merely because the court would 
have awarded some other figure:106 As it the case with all appeals on quantum, an appellate court 
will only interfere if it is shown that the primary judge erred in principle, gave improper or 
                                                             
104 All listed in Facton Ltd v Dash Industries [2010] FMCA 709. 
105 See Halal Certification Authority Pty Limited v Quality Kebabs Wholesalers Pty Ltd (2014) 223 FCR 540 at 
[11]-[20] - though Perram J did note, at [16], that the authorities were ‘difficult to explain on a consistent basis’ 
106 Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 2 at [50] 
insufficient emphasis to a fact or was mistaken as to a relevant fact.107 This is because, while  
appellate courts are generally reluctant to interfere with a finding of fact, they are particularly 
reluctant to interfere with a finding on the quantum of damages because that is generally much 
more a matter of speculation and estimate.108 
 
The Considerations Mandated by s 115(4)(b) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (and its 
Equivalents in the other Statutes) – the Considerations  to which Courts are to have 
‘regard’ 
Meaning of ‘having regard to’ 
In Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 2 at [53] Bersanko J noted: ‘It 
is to be remembered that s 115(4)(b) requires the court to “have regard to” the listed factors. That 
means it must take them into account and give weight to them: R v Hunt; Ex parte Sean Investments 
Pty Ltd (1979) 180 CLR 322 at 329’. 
In R v Hunt; Ex parte Sean Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 180 CLR 322, a case relating to the fixing of 
fees for a nursing home, what Mason J said (at 329) was: 
‘When sub-s (7) directs the Permanent Head to "have regard to" the costs, it requires him to 
take those costs into account and to give weight to them as a fundamental element in 
making his determination. …. 
However, the sub-section does not direct the Permanent Head to fix the scale of fees 
exclusively by reference to costs necessarily incurred and profit. The sub-section is so 
generally expressed that it is not possible to say that he is confined to these two 
considerations. The Permanent Head is entitled to have regard to other considerations 
which show or tend to show that a scale of fees arrived at by reference to costs necessarily 
incurred, with or without a profit factor, is excessive or unreasonable’. 
 
The Six Specific Considerations 
1. The Flagrancy of the Infringement  
 
In Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 at 477 Wilcox J said, referring to s 
115(4)(b), that:  
‘Paragraphs structured in this way have been interpreted in comparable overseas statutes as 
requiring that flagrant conduct be shown: see Ravenscroft v Herbert and New England 
Library [1980] RPC 193 at 208 and Wellington Newspapers Ltd v Dealers Guide Ltd (1984) 4 
IPR 417 at 420-21. Without deciding the point I am content to assume, for the purposes of 
the present case, that this approach is equally applicable to s 115(4). I am able to deal with 
the matter in this way because it is clear that the respondent’s conduct constituted a 
flagrant infringement of the plaintiff’s rights’.  
 
It is clear, therefore, that His Honour did not give the matter due consideration. It is also clear that 
this is not the accepted view of the ‘flagrancy’ factor in Australia. That view is that ‘flagrancy’ is 
merely one consideration that the courts must take into account and that additional damages may 
                                                             
107 Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa (1968) 119 CLR 118 at 124; Miller v. Jennings ((1954) 92 CLR 190 
108 Davies v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1942] AC 601; [1942] 1 All ER 657 at 664 per Lord Wright 
be awarded even in cases where there is no evidence of flagrancy. See, for example, Raben 
Footwear v Polygram Records (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 93, Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions (1997) 76 
FCR 565 at 575,  MJA Scientifics International Pty Ltd v SC Johnson & Son Pty Ltd (1999) 43 IPR 275 at 
282 and Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 1067 at [32], (among others). 
 
Defining ‘flagrancy’: The courts have used various definitions of ‘flagrancy’ in the additional 
damages provisions. One of the more regularly cited is that which Sundberg J adopted in 
MJA Scientifics International Pty Ltd v SC Johnson & Son Pty Ltd (1999) 43 IPR 275 at 282. He said: 
 
‘It has been said that ‘flagrancy’ involves “calculated disregard of the plaintiff’s rights, or 
cynical pursuit of benefit”:  Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty Ltd [1977] VR 65 at 70; “scandalous 
conduct, deceit including deliberate and calculated infringement where a defendant reaps a 
pecuniary advantage in excess of the damages he would otherwise have to pay”:  Copinger 
and Skone James on Copyright, 13th ed, 1991, p 344; “the existence of scandalous conduct, 
deceit and such like; it includes deliberate and calculated copyright infringement”:  
Ravenscroft v Herbert & New English Library Ltd [1980] RPC 193 at 208; Autodesk Australia 
Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 17 IPR 69; 94 ALR 472 at 478’.109 
In Raben Footwear Pty Ltd v Polygram Records Inc (1997) 75 FCR 88 at 103 Tamberlin J noted:  
‘In ordinary usage “flagrancy” connotes conduct which could probably be described as 
“glaring, notorious, scandalous” or “blatant”’. 
Limitations on ‘Flagrancy’: What it does not include are: ‘mere mistake or carelessness. If the 
infringer mistakenly believed that he or she owned the relevant copyright (Prior v Lansdowne Press) 
or acted in the bona fide belief that no copyright subsisted in the plaintiff’s work (International Credit 
Control Ltd v Axelsen [1974] 1 NZLR 695) the conduct is not flagrant.  See also Tyco Industries Inc v 
Interlego AG [1987] 9 IPR 133 and on appeal to the Privy Council Interlego AG v Tyco Industries Inc 
[1988] 3 WLR 678; [1988] 3 All ER 949’.110 
In addition, while ‘deliberate’ and ‘calculated’ conduct can establish flagrancy ‘the presence of such 
elements in and of themselves do not justify an award of additional damage …’,111 and ‘flagrancy is 
not established by proof of mere knowledge of copying’.112 
 ‘[T]he flagrancy of conduct to be considered … is flagrancy of the infringement …, not the flagrancy 
of another wrong committed by the defendant’113 Therefore if the flagrancy is in an associated 
breach of contract or fiduciary duty, that will not establish ‘flagrancy’ for the purposes of the 
provision.114  However, the courts have taken such reprehensible conduct into account as ‘all other 
                                                             
109 See also Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 1067 at [35] 
110 Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565 at 575. See also Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd 
(1994) 54 FCR 240 at 280; 130 ALR 659 at 695: ‘The infringements by Mr King and Mr Rylands arose because of 
indifference and neglect of duty, not by reason of a deliberate and calculated action. In these circumstances it 
would not be appropriate to characterise their conduct as “flagrant’’. 
111 Woolworths Ltd v Olsen (2004) 184 FLR 121 at [343] per Einstein J. 
112 International Writing Institute Inc v Rimila Pty Ltd (1994) 30 IPR 250; [1994] FCA 1509 at [19] per Lockhart J. 
See also Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd v Tonnex International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] 312 ALR 705 at [45]-[47] 
113 Luxottica Retail Australia v Grant [2009] NSWSC 126; (2009) 81 IPR 26 at [37] 
114 Woolworths Ltd v Olsen (2004) 184 FLR 121 at [345]-[348 per Einstein J. In Luxottica Retail Australia v Grant 
[2009] NSWSC 126; (2009) 81 IPR 26 (at [42]) White J commented about the Woolworths case, ‘the intractable 
difficulty for Woolworths is that the greater part of its claim to additional damages is founded on an egregious 
breach of a right that copyright does not protect’. (emphasis added). 
relevant matters’. Such conduct which was associated with, but separate from, the infringement has 
included the defendant’s plan to steal work away from his company (Bailey v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 
53 FCR 102 at 114) and flagrant infringements compounded by outrageous and frightening threats 
and false defences to the plaintiff’s claims threats of physical violence (Sony Entertainment 
(Australia) Ltd v Smith [2005] FCA 228; (2008) 215 ALR 788 at 810 [165]-[172]).  
Underlying the difference between additional damages and exemplary damage White J commented, 
in Luxottica Retail Australia v Grant [2009] NSWSC 126; (2009) 81 IPR 26 at [39]:  ‘The section does 
not require proof that the defendant has acted in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.  
This must necessarily follow from the fact that it is not a prerequisite to the making of an award of 
additional damages under s 115(4) that the plaintiff establish that the infringement of copyright was 
flagrant’.(emphasis added) 
2. Deterrence  
Deterrence was only inserted into the Copyright Act as a specific factor to be taken into account as 
part of the 2003 amendments. Despite that, the need for deterrence had long been taken into 
acknowledged (as a ‘relevant matter’)115 so its specific inclusion was really, at least in part, a 
codification of the existing case law.116 
The need for deterrence has two aspects: the need for specific deterrence to prevent the infringer 
infringing again117 and the need for general deterrence to deter others from committing similar 
infringements118 – whether against the plaintiff or against others.119 
In relation to the need for specific deterrence, the requirement to consider deterrence can, on 
occasion, operate to reduce the likelihood of additional damages being awarded, or if they are 
awarded, to reduce their quantum. For example in Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 
1006 at [49] Jessup J refers to deterrence and says:  
‘I do not think that the need arises to provide for any deterrent, additional to the sobering 
impact which Acohs’ success in this long, expensive and sobering litigation will presumably 
have had on the respondents.  With respect to the possible future use of reproductions of 
copyright works made in the past, the delivery up order which I propose to make should, of 
course, obviate the need for any further deterrent. With respect to the possibility of future 
infringing conduct … the disposition of the present case will be marked by the making of 
permanent injunctions binding the respondents not to act in ways that would amount to 
infringements of Acohs copyright. I have no reason not to assume that the respondents will 
                                                             
115 See, for example, MJA Scientifics International Pty Ltd v SC Johnson & Sons Pty Ltd (1999) 43 IPR 275 
116 Bailey v Namol Pty Ltd (1994) 125 ALR 228 at 239;  Microsoft Corporation v TYN Electronics Pty Ltd (in liq) 
[2004] FCR 1307; (2005) 63 IPR 137 says at [47]; Zero Tolerance Entertainment Inc v Venus Adult Shops Pty Ltd 
[2007] FMCA 155 at [166]. 
117 See, for example, Halal Certification Authority Pty Limited v Scadilone Pty Limited [2014] FCA 614 at [111] 
118 Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd v Tonnex International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] 312 ALR 705 at [39] citing Lamb v 
Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1. On the need for both specific and general deterrence see Henley Arch Pty Ltd v 
Lucky Homes Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1217 at [259] and [262] where Beach J held that while the ‘modest amount’ 
awarded was a sufficient specific deterrent, he thought that awarding less would not be sufficient general 
deterrence. See also Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc v Farley (No 5) [2009] FCA 1298 at [139] 
119 Microsoft Corporation v Ezy Loans Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 54; [2004] FCA 1135 at [95] per Stone J: ‘It is 
important to more than the applicants that copyright infringers are not encouraged to think that by ignoring 
court proceedings they can escape the consequences of calculated infringement of the rights of others in the 
pursuit of profits’ 
comply with those injunctions, and, to the extent that there may be a risk of non-
compliance, I cannot see that the awarding of additional damages at this stage would 
effectively add to the likelihood of that occurring’.   
Deterrence can also reduce the likelihood of additional damages being awarded as a general 
deterrent. For example, in Luxottica Retail Australia v Grant [2009] NSWSC 126; (2009) 81 IPR 2643 
White J noted at [43], in relation to a submission to the effect that additional damages were 
warranted to prevent other employees from committing similar infringements: 
 
‘… the very institution of the proceedings with the attendant costs, time and anxiety that 
such proceedings must entail, together with orders for the delivery up of the documents, 
would itself in all probability have a deterrent effect in respect of any other employees of 
the plaintiff who might be minded to copy the plaintiff’s documents other than for the 
purposes of their employment.  Nonetheless, I accept that an award of additional damages is 
likely to enhance that deterrent effect.  This is one factor to go in the scales in assessing 
whether it is proper to order additional damages’ (emphasis added). 120 
3. The conduct of the defendant after the act constituting the infringement or, if relevant, 
after the defendant was informed that there had been an alleged infringement 
Like the insertion into the legislation of ‘deterrence’ as a factor to be considered when determining 
whether it was ‘proper’ to award additional damages, the insertion to the defendant’s post-
infringement conduct as a consideration was seen as largely declaratory of what courts had already 
been doing in the cases they had decided.  
However, it has been held that the conduct that was taken into account in the earlier cases was 
‘conduct which was relevant to the substantive allegations made against the respondent’121 – such 
as continuing infringements122 (particularly if they were accompanied with a ‘defiant attitude’123), 
deliberately avoiding service,124 filing a false defence,125 and refusing to obey orders for, inter alia, 
discovery.126 It did not include ‘conduct of the defence insofar as it relates to procedural matters and 
matters whereby the applicants are put to the proof of their case, albeit unreasonably.127   
 
Positive actions, such as early co-operation (including not defending the action), ceasing the 
infringing conduct and expressing regret128 (so long as it was genuine and timely129) can also be 
considered and can negate or limit any award of additional damages. 
                                                             
120 For a contrary result on different facts see Fortuity Pty Ltd v Barcza (1995) 32 IPR 517 at 533  
121 Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 1067 at [45] 
122 Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240; 130 ALR 659; Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On 
Clothing Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 633at [36]; Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at 
[107] 
123 FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [10]-[17] - particularly [17]. 
124 SBO Pictures Inc v KAOS Shop Pty Ltd [2006] FMCA 82 
125 Microsoft Corporation v Goodview Electronics Pty Ltd (2000) 49 IPR 578 
126 Microsoft Corporation v Ezy Loans Pty Ltd (2004) 63 IPR 54; [2004] FCA 1135 at [95]. See also, for example, 
Eagle Rock Entertainment Ltd v Caisley [2005] FCA 1238 at [5], Review Australia Pty Ltd v New Cover Group Pty 
Ltd [2008] FCA 1589; (2008) 79 IPR 236 and Deckers Outdoor Corporation Inc v Farley (No 5) [2009] FCA 1298 
at [102]-[113]  
127 Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 1067 at [45]. It was considered ‘that these are matters more 
appropriately dealt with by an appropriate order for costs’.   
128 Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Miyamoto [2004] FCA 982 at [21] 
129 Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 279; 130 ALR 659 at 694; Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty 
Ltd (2012) FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [107] 
 
In relation to conduct of the proceedings the vast majority of the cases have followed Goldberg J’s 
view in Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 1067 at [45] that defendants are entitled to put the 
plaintiff to proof and, otherwise, to conduct their defence as they see fit – within accepted 
procedures and provided it is not ‘wilfully contemptuous’130 - and that, accordingly, that conduct is 
not to be considered when determining whether it is ‘proper’ to award additional damages. Instead, 
that behavior can be taken into account in the determination of an appropriate order for costs.131 
4. Whether the infringement involved the conversion of a work or other subject-matter from 
hardcopy or analog form into a digital or other electronic machine-readable form 
This consideration is really non-contentious. It was inserted into the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) in 2000 
(by the Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000 (Cth)), specifically to allow courts to take 
into account situations where the infringement included the conversion of a work from hardcopy or 
analog form to digital (or other electronic machine-readable) form. It only applies to infringements 
of copyright and, to date, seems to have been a consideration in only one reported case - Sullivan v 
FNH Investments Pty Ltd t/as Palm Bay Hideaway (2003) 57 IPR 63; [2003] FCA 323 at [98] 
(confirmed in FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [23]), where the defendants 
were found liable for additional damages, at least in part because their infringement had included 
converting the plaintiffs photos (which they had ordered but for which they had refused to pay) 
from hardcopy to digital format for use in their brochures and online advertising.  
5. Any benefit shown to have accrued to the defendant by reason of the infringement 
At the outset it needs to be noted that ‘benefit to the defendant’ in this context can only be used to 
determine whether the court should be ‘satisfied that it is proper’ to award additional damages. It is 
not however an appropriate determinant of the appropriate measure of compensatory damages. 
This is for two reasons: 
a. First, compensatory damages are, as has already been seen, designed to put the plaintiff in 
the position in which he or she would have been but for the infringement (the standard 
tortious measure of quantum). Therefore, as Gowans J said in Prior v Lansdowne Press Pty 
Ltd [1977] VR 65 at 70; (1975) 29 FLR 59 at 65; (1975) 12 ALR 59 at 70: ‘It is however, the 
damage to the copyright in the hands of the plaintiff and not the benefit to the defendant 
that is the critical test; and  
b. Secondly, divesting a defendant of the benefit obtained through the infringement is, in 
effect, to award an account of profits and, as already seen, compensatory damages and an 
account are inconsistent remedies – so a plaintiff cannot, through the mechanism of 
additional damages, receive what would otherwise be inconsistent remedies.132 
                                                             
130 Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 281; 130 ALR 659 at 696 per von Doussa J. See also 
Truong Giang Corporation v Quach [2015] FCA 1097 at [138] per Wigney J: ‘… post-infringement conduct … is 
more relevant to the appropriate order as to costs. That said, it is difficult to see why some aspects of the 
conduct by a respondent, in defence of infringement proceedings, might not be relevant to the award of 
additional damages …. Conduct of the proceedings which involved high-handedness, dishonesty, recalcitrance, 
or flagrant disregard or, or deficiencies in compliance with, discovery orders or notices to produce might, at 
the very least, suggest a greater need for an award of additional damages that would deter future infringing 
conduct by the respondent’. 
131 See, for example, Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 281; 130 ALR 659 at 696J; Flags 2000 
Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 1067 at [40]; Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 2) (2008) 76 
IPR 763 at [17]; Facton Ltd v Rifai fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [109] and [113]; 
Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Lucky Homes Pty Ltd  [2016] FCA 1217 at [248] 
132 See, for example, Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [31] 
In the context of determining whether it is proper to award additional damages because the 
defendant has obtained some benefit the courts have developed a number of principles: 
1. Of basic importance was Lockhart J’s finding in Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd 
(1997) 76 FCR 565 at 576: that ‘benefit’, in the context of the section is not limited to 
pecuniary benefit; any form of benefit can be considered and it can even accrue in situations 
where there is no clearly discernible tangible financial benefit.133 
 
Therefore, in Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472, where the defendant 
had imported and distributed pirate copies of the plaintiff’s AutoCAD computer programs 
free of charge to customers who purchased computers from him, Wilcox J awarded 
additional damages on the basis that (at 478): ‘These actions conferred upon him a 
commercial advantage vis-à-vis his competitors. He was able to offer his customers, free of 
charge, valuable computer programs’. 
 
The same can be seen in Columbia Pictures Industries Inc and Tri-Star Pictures Inc v Luckins 
(1996) 34 IPR 504; [1996] FCA 1606 at [45] where Tamberlin J found the benefit to be the 
‘significant advantage over his competitors, including the applicants’ that the defendant 
obtained by importing infringing copies of movie, ‘by reason of the contemporaneity of the 
distribution by him of films in NTSC format, with those being shown for the first time in 
cinemas in Australia’. 
In Sullivan v FNH Investments Pty Ltd t/as Palm Bay Hideaway (2003) 57 IPR 63; [2003] FCA 
323 at [97] (confirmed in FNH Investments Pty Ltd v Sullivan [2003] FCAFC 246 at [23]) the 
benefit was the likelihood that the defendant would ‘have attracted custom by publishing 
the [infringing’ photos in its brochure and in high quality travel magazines and their 
corresponding websites’.  
In Leica Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 at [102] Collier J found that 
the defendant ‘having the applicants’ source code available as a reference point at a time 
when he was employed by [his new employer] is a tangible benefit’. 
2. As with all of the other matters to which the courts can have regard, ‘benefit’, by itself, can 
be sufficient to ground a claim for additional damages.134 
 
3. Although additional damages may be awarded where it can be established that a defendant 
obtained a benefit as a result of the infringement, the purpose of additional  damages is not 
simply to strip the defendant of any pecuniary benefit. The real purpose of additional 
damages is punishment.135 Accordingly, a finding of benefit may be used to justify awarding 
additional damages but the quantum of those damages need have no direct relationship 
with the amount of that benefit.136 Quantum is determined by looking not only at the 
question of benefit but at all of the other factors to which courts are to have regard,137 
especially, in many cases, the need for an appropriate deterrent.138 
 
                                                             
133 Dynamic Supplies Pty Ltd v Tonnex International Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] 312 ALR 705 at [48] 
134 Acohs Pty Ltd v Ucorp Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 1006 at [52] per Jessup J 
135 Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [40] 
136 An outcome which is entirely in keeping with the courts unfettered discretion to award additional damages 
and the fact that they are ‘at large’. 
137 Facton Ltd v Rifai Fashions Pty Ltd (2012) 199 FCR 569; [2012] FCAFC 9 at [41] 
138 See, for example, Halal Certification Authority Pty Limited v Scadilone Pty Limited [2014] FCA 614 at [111] 
4. There is no requirement, before benefit can be taken into account that it be quantifiable. As 
was said in Spotless Group Limited v Blanco Catering Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 979 at [138]: ‘As 
regards the consideration of “any benefit” shown to have been accrued to the defendant for 
the purposes of assessing additional damages, it does not import any particular quantitative 
or qualitative requirement.  Even though there is no precise evidence as to the profits or 
income derived by the defendant as a result of their infringing conduct, courts will readily 
assume that their activities are profitable and that the use of the plaintiff’s copyright 
material was not unimportant to its success.139   
6. All other relevant matters; 
As Goldberg J said in Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 1067 at [32]: ‘… I do not have to make 
findings as to the existence of “all other relevant matters” but rather I am to have regard to them in 
determining whether I am satisfied that it is proper to award additional damages’. 
In Polygram Pty Ltd v Golden Editions Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 565, Lockhart J said (at 576): ‘Some 
guidance about the matters which may be taken into account as “other relevant matters” under s 
115(4) may be those which are considered in a common law action for exemplary damages: see XL 
Petroleum (N5W) Pty Ltd v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 155 CLR 448 per Gibbs CJ (at 461) and 
Brennan J (at 472)’. 
Using that guidance matters that have been taken into consideration under this head have included 
cultural considerations,140 attempts by the defendants to obtain permission or a licence,141 the 
difficult confronting the owners of intellectual property in protecting their rights,142 the anxiety that 
might accompany the realization that their intellectual property had been compromised,143 the 
cooperation (or otherwise) of the defendant in the action,144 previous involvement by the defendant 
in intellectual property infringements,145 the defendant’s knowledge that the conduct in question 
was an infringement146 (or otherwise),147 the duration of the infringement (especially if it was known 
to be an infringement and was one that could have been cured by obtaining a readily available 
licence)148, the improbability that the identified breaches were the only infringements by the 
defendant149 and any acquiescence by the plaintiff in the infringing behavior.150 
  
                                                             
139 Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 (at 478) per Wilcox J 
140 Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 240 at 279; 130 ALR 659 at 695 
141 ibid 
142 Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 at 479 per Wilcox J 
143 Leica Geosystems Pty Ltd v Koudstaal (No 3) [2014] FCA 1129 at [103] per Collier J 
144 Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 at 479 per Wilcox J 
 and Flags 2000 Pty Ltd v Smith [2003] FCA 1067 at [40]  
145 Microsoft Corporation v PC Club Australia Pty Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 262 
146 Futuretronics.com.au Pty Ltd v Graphix Labels Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 746; (2008) IPR 763 at [20] per 
Bersanko J 
147 Luxottica Retail Australia v Grant [2009] NSWSC 126; (2009) 81 IPR 26 at [42] per White J and Review 2 Pty 
Ltd (in liq) v Redberry Enterprise Pty Ltd (2008) 173 FCR 450 at [84] per Kenny J 
148 Australasian Performing Right Association Limited v Riceboy Pty Limited [2011] FMCA at [29]: ‘Here the 
conduct was flagrant and sustained over four years. … The respondents could have taken a licence at any time, 
but chose not to and they have ignored APRA, its members and the processes of this Court’. 
149 Autodesk Australia Pty Ltd v Cheung (1990) 94 ALR 472 at 479 per Wilcox J and Halal Certification Authority 
Pty Limited v Scadilone Pty Limited [2014] FCA 614 at [107] per Perram J 
150 Fraser side Holdings v Venus Adult Shops (2005) 222 ALR 388 at [58] 
Conclusion 
While the common law does make provision for aggravated and exemplary damages as a form of 
‘punishment’ for the miscreant the instances in which those remedies are awarded are limited.  
The provision of ‘additional damages’ in the intellectual property statutes involve a much less 
constrained remedy and one which the courts have been willing to deploy to demonstrate their 
disapproval of the infringing behaviour, to punish it and to act as a deterrent to similar behaviour by 
either the infringer of others who might otherwise be tempted to infringe.  
 
